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Abstract 
In conventional data communication networks, the basic network components 
are passive; routing decisions are made solely on the basis of packet header in-
formation. In contrast, active networks allow added computation within the 
network through user-defined routing and processing instructions, providing 
the on-demand installation of powerful software-based network services. 
As an adaptation of previous active networks, this thesis presents an ar-
chitecture based entirely in middleware. By utilising middleware services, the 
architecture resolves authentication, memory-management, and interconnec-
tivity issues otherwise assumed as inherent, and enables a highly functional 
multiple-language interface for the deployment of dynamic protocols. After 
describing the architectural design, an empirical system evaluation is pre-
sented with comparisons to both conventional network protocols and a well-
known existing active network architecture. Results indicate performance 
improvements over the existing architecture, and demonstrate the feasibility 
of a multiple-language active network infrastructure implemented entirely in 
middleware. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Definition of an Active Network 
Components within conventional IP-based networks are passive in that rout-
ing decisions are made solely on the basis of packet header information. 
Packet payloads are not processed within the network, thus limiting network 
functionality and capabilities. Some end-to-end services such as hypertext 
can be provided within the existing IP infrastructure of simple packet for-
warding, but the current surge in demand for network-level functionality (as 
reflected by Internet Engineering Task Force activities on IntServ /RSVP, 
DiffServ, and IPv6) suggests that the current 'one size fits all' IP model may 
no longer be suitable for today's networks. 
The new active network paradigm, in contrast, provides networked ap-
plications and users with a programmable interface that supports the dy-
namic modification of a network's behaviour~bypassing both the standards 
committee and the hardware vendor in order to cater for ever-changing 
user demands. Such flexibility is achieved by allowing the specification and 
activation of complex processing instructions at all participating interme-
diate active network routers, facilitating the run-time installation of arbi-
trary software-based routing protocols [49]. Numerous applications of active 
networks may be envisioned, such as dynamic compression, arbitrary net-
work caching, and on-demand encryption between endpoints in conventional, 
multi-casted, and future IP-based networks. Whilst several implementations 
of active network architectures exist within the network research community, 
active networks are not yet being used commercially. 
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1.2 Background 
The DARPA Information Technology Office sponsors and governs the main 
body of active network research. In line with the previous definition of an 
active network, DARPA's mission for all active network research is to "enable 
networks that turn on a dime" [30]. Active network research is primarily 
concerned with providing efficient and highly flexible multi-layered networks 
that do not compromise the security of end-users, intermediate hosts, or the 
network state itself. The remainder of this section expands on the primary 
goals of active network research. 
1. 2.1 Functionality 
An important goal of active networks is to markedly increase the level of 
functionality that is currently offered by conventional networks. By offering 
virtually unbounded levels of routing computation within the network itself, 
it is envisaged that new services can be deployed rapidly without the need 
for universal standardisation. 
It should also be possible for active networks to keep pace with the rapid 
increases in network complexity as user demand continues to expand. As 
network topologies and throughput rates grow, it is expected that the active 
network paradigm will be able to address the current anomaly between the 
rate at which users' demands change and the pace at which new services can 
be deployed. 
1. 2. 2 Efficiency 
An unprecedented level of node computation is available to an active network 
when compared to the packet processing power of conventional networks. 
Nodes within an active network can exploit the current network conditions 
and other network state information to gain optimisations that are otherwise 
considered unobtainable. 
By introducing the run-time verification of network states prior to making 
routing decisions, it is theoretically possible to eliminate the need for packet 
retransmission. This is achieved by providing network logic that can simply 
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reroute congested network paths and bypass links with high error rates. An 
appropriate analogy can be drawn from a commuter selecting an alternative 
route to the destination because of a traffic report broadcasted on the car ra-
dio. Hence, a 100% increase in the useful data rate to networked applications 
is a realistic goal for active network architectures. 
1.2.3 Safety and Security 
The active network paradigm strives to increase the level of security avail-
able in conventional networks by recognising a multi-tiered structure of users 
and services for both static and mobile networks. A fundamental principle 
of active networks is that now both users and processes require authentica-
tion to allow safe access to network resources. Subsequently, separate data 
transmission and administrative functions must be controlled according to 
the type or request and the security policy in place [3]. 
1.3 Outstanding Active Network Issues 
Many aspects of active networks remain unresolved, and consequently the 
first generation of active network research appears to be fading out [33]. Such 
issues include the high level of performance degradation at each active node, 
the security risks of processing arbitrary code modules, and the establishment 
of bounds for core active network services. Whilst the provision of enhanced 
security services is an important goal of active network research, it must 
also be stated that the preservation of existing network security is a goal 
within itself. Allowing the introduction of arbitrary routing computation on 
intermediate nodes poses many new security issues, in terms of both network 
stability and the protection of active hosts. 
To elaborate on node performance issues, it is apparent that active nodes 
in a network perform a greater level of processing per packet. Depending on 
the routing logic installed in the active network, active nodes may also have 
considerable overhead inflicted upon them in order to maintain state infor-
mation such as traffic flows and error rates. Whilst there can be a marked 
per-node degradation in performance when comparing the role of packet for-
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warding on an active network to a conventional network, it is expected that 
the inter-node optimisations such as congestion avoidance and intelligent 
data caching can improve the overall rates of end-to-end communication. 
However, this is still to be proven for many network environments. 
1.4 Research Goals 
This thesis aims to provide: 
1. A comprehensive survey of current active network research including 
existing architectures, active network-specific languages, host imple-
mentation languages, and specialised protocols and interfaces. 
2. An analysis of middleware-based active network architectures, leading 
to the design of a functional middleware-based active network proto-
type. 
3. A detailed performance analysis of the active network prototype under 
various topologies. 
Results from this research will be used to aid the future development of 
active network architectures, protocols, and applications by verifying cur-
rent assumptions and/ or exposing any anomalies that may be present within 
the paradigm of current active networks. After assessing the feasibility of 
the active network prototype, as the basis of this research, it is envisaged 
that a hardware-based active router could be developed with the aim to pro-
vide high-performance next-generation networks without sacrificing network 
security. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces the active network paradigm with a sur-
vey of the various architectures and languages that are associated with the 
first generation of active networking research. Next, Chapter 3 reveals the 
outstanding issues such as performance degradation and the security risks of 
processing arbitrary code modules. 
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Chapter 4 of this thesis analyses the role of middleware in active network-
ing, by explaining the origins of middleware and revealing its suitability as 
an implementation framework for an active network architecture. This chap-
ter then presents the Component Object Model Active Network (COMAN) 
architecture and explains the motivation for such an implementation. The 
design principles and implementation details of the architecture are also de-
scribed. Chapter 5 presents details of an evaluation of COMAN's perfor-
mance, including both experimental design and results. Outstanding issues 
and limitations of the architecture are discussed in Chapter 6, providing 
direction for further work. 
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Chapter II 
Previous Active Network Research 
This chapter surveys the current state of active networks and associated 
research projects. The motivations for the development of active networks are 
discussed, followed by a description of a generic active network architecture. 
Following this, several current active network architectures are presented, 
including a description of several frameworks that address active network 
security. Next, active network specific programming languages are discussed, 
followed by a presentation of several individual active network protocols and 
interfaces. Today's common programming languages are then addressed to 
reveal the advantages and disadvantages of software-based active networks. 
Finally, recent work towards testbed networks for active network research is 
introduced. 
2.1 Motivations for an Active Network 
As noted by Tennenhouse and Wetherall [49], an object-oriented approach to 
networking is suggested every five or ten years, with varied levels of success. 
Two early examples of object-oriented network services are SNMP v2.0 [13] 
and the ACE socket wrappers [44]. SNMP v2.0 introduced an object-oriented 
management information base to better contain collections of related data 
modules, which quickly spawned several proprietary implementations of an 
object-oriented API named SNMP++. Similarly, the ACE socket wrapper 
implementation borrowed some of the high-level concepts from the object-
oriented programming paradigm, providing a set of socket classes that re-
move many of the low-level complexities and sources of potential application-
programmer errors. 
Whilst the above examples display that an object-oriented approach to 
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networking can provide benefits in terms of managing programmatic com-
plexity, the main goal of conventional networks has always been that of per-
formance. As the IP protocol has shown us for the last decade, performance 
can be achieved by limiting processing wherever possible. By restricting con-
figuration to only a handful of low-level IP primitives such as the type of 
service field, network routers are allowed to concentrate their processing on 
what IP does best-that of storing and forwarding packets. 
From a vastly different perspective, the drive for greater performance of 
software systems threw the entire computing industry (in particular the fi-
nancial sector) into a crisis for the majority of the 1980s. Analysis of the 
aftermath revealed that the growing complexity of software systems greatly 
increased the number of errors and development time for not just the modi-
fication and expansion of projects, but. in routine system maintainance itself. 
The threat of unmanageable software systems due to issues of complexity 
spawned a shift in the programming paradigm to that of object-oriented soft-
ware development-which was up until this time considered by the industry 
to be a novel idea but a gross waste of resources. 
Under the new paradigm, software engineers could reuse 'known good' 
code components, or adapt components for specific needs via inheritance 
rather than recreating entire systems from scratch. By using an object-
oriented (or component-based) approach, complexity could be managed by 
logically dividing the entire system into subsystems for development by indi-
vidual project teams. As an analogy, this is similar to the way that electrical 
engineers select basic components such as resistors and capacitors for the 
construction of new devices, rather than rebuilding the entire device. Sub-
sequently, software development in the 1990s proved the concept of object-
oriented programming, with industries' most popular language now being 
C++. Other object-oriented languages such as Java are also gaining a strong 
following. 
The initial resistance to object-oriented software development was mainly 
due to the price paid in terms of system performance. However, the actual 
cost for object-oriented methodologies and languages is in nearly all cases 
insignificant because of the ever-reducing cost of computing power, not to 
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mention the above benefits such as component reuse and management of 
complexity. Hence, the object-oriented programming paradigm has, over the 
years, defied its label as an 'inefficient' practice. 
As the Internet continues to expand at an exponential rate of growth in 
terms of both traffic volumes and number of hosts, the software crisis of the 
1980s should act as a constant reminder to control all associated complexi-
ties in networking or suffer the consequences such as decreased performance 
and slow adaptability. The drawn-out nature of IPv6 adaptation provides 
evidence that the complexity of the Internet is already raising managability 
concerns. Even many private IP networks suffer from issues of complexity, 
especially where multimedia traffic is involved, as indicated by the ever in-
creasing popularity of media-stream servers, application-level firewalls, and 
caching proxy servers-all catering for functions that the IP protocol over-
looked and does not scale well to. 
Accordingly, this is where the role of active networks comes into existence. 
As introduced by Saltzer et al. [43], the end-to-end argument in the context 
of active networks suggests that performance should be measured in terms of 
application layer throughput, rather than in pure transport or network layer 
performance. Active networks allow vastly increased levels of computation at 
potentially every node in a given network, allowing the run-time adaptation 
of new protocols and services through comprehensive software interfaces, 
as opposed to hardwired IP networks that only allow minimal changes in 
configuration. 
Today's networks are becoming unmistakably more complicated as both 
the size and number of host services increases. Any changes to networks, 
ranging from protocol version updates to the introduction of new protocols, 
require either service interruptions or specialised bridging hardware and soft-
ware (which is then discarded), with both alternatives being costly in terms 
of both time and resources. Additionally, whenever changes are introduced, 
new components and services tend to be constructed from the ground up, 
using IPv6 as a relevant example. 
Current research in active networks suggests that as network researchers, 
we could learn from the software crisis, and avoid most of the problems 
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that the software industry of the late 1980s incurred-problems such as a 
vast increase in complexity due to a low-level and unstructured approach 
to building systems. By reusing existing components such as 'configurable' 
base network services, and by subsequent development and deployment of 
higher-layered routing protocols on demand (in software and/or hardware), 
it may be possible to address the anomaly between changing user demands 
and the current time taken to upgrade networks, regardless of the underlying 
transport mechanism. 
Additionally, by giving a degree of network service control to end appli-
cations, the underlying network logic can afford to give less consideration to 
the type of data being transferred. For example, where a multimedia stream 
is being transferred, particular attention must be paid to the order of packet 
delivery, as well as to satisfy a pre-specified minimum throughput rate. How-
ever, active networks allow the data itself to specify how it is to be processed 
at each point in the network. 
The obvious tradeoff for active networks is in terms of performance, but 
as the cost of computational power within nodes continues to decrease, the 
subsequent increase in control over network processing allows the network 
to optimise traffic flows, depending on rates of congestion and user-defined 
parameters. Additionally, new services can be introduced such as on demand 
compression and encryption, multicasting, QoS monitoring and enforcement, 
and mobile host adaptation. Following the end-to-end argument, current 
research into active networking attempts to prove that such enhancements 
to delivery of data at the application level results in an overall improvement 
in network utilisation, for a modest increase in the computational power 
required for network devices. 
2.2 General Active Network Architectures 
This section provides an introduction to the typical active network archi-
tectures, presenting the components from which such active networks are 
constructed. Active network architectures tend to fall into two broad cat-
egories: packet-based and node-based. An explanation of these categories 
is now presented, followed by an overview of the individual active network 
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components. 
2.2.1 Packet-Based Active Networks 
Packet-based, or capsule-based, active networks are arguably the most radical 
shift away from conventional networks, as individual packets in a packet-
based network carry the router processing instructions inline. Not only can 
every packet in a stream contain different processing and routing instructions, 
the logic of these instructions can result in packets duplicating themselves for 
the purposes of multicasting [10], or even changing a packet's own routing 
logic via dynamic programming. One packet-based active network project, 
named Cognitive Packet Networks, extends as far as using machine learning 
algorithms to dynamically route TCP packets [19]. 
The underlying principle of all packet-based active networks is the same: 
provide a relatively small unit of code from a known language within each 
packet header during packet construction, and all active nodes within the 
network will execute the instructions accordingly. A secondary role of active 
network nodes could· be the maintainance of a soft information state per node, 
and/ or the concatenation of additional data or processing instructions onto 
specific packets. Packet processing instructions are generally in the form of 
a safe scripting language such as SafeTcl [37], or an intermediate language 
such as byte-compiled Java. The merits of these data processing languages 
and others are discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.2.2 Node-Based Active Networks 
Somewhere between the radical realms of packet-based active networks and 
the more traditional IF-based networks lie node-based active networks. Node-
based active networks allow the run-time specification of code modules, but 
they are installed at active nodes on the network as opposed to being carried 
inline by individual packets. Packet processing is initiated at active nodes 
when the inspection of a packet reveals a reference to a known code module. 
Because node-based active networks are not subjected to the overhead of 
carrying routing instructions for every packet of transmitted data, installed 
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routing modules tend to be larger and more complex, offering a potentially 
unbounded array of routing and processing functions. 
According to the constraints of the given node-based architecture, the 
end-programmer associates code modules to either an entire stream of data 
or individual packets-normally via the architecture's API if available. This 
association is made by inserting code module references into the packet or 
stream header, with a lookup function at each active node proving the link 
between the packets and their associated code modules. Hence, node-based 
active networks are very similar to conventional IP-based networks, with the 
exception of unbounded user-specified processing and routing logic at every 
point within the network. 
2.2.3 Active Network Components 
Regardless of whether an active network is node-based or packet-based, ac-
tive networks tend to share the same fundamental construction. Figure 2.1 
presents this general active network architecture, which is composed of sev-
eral base components. Whilst this figure represents a simplification of cur-
rent active network components and architectures, all of the architectures 
and components presented in this chapter can be classified by this model. 
A simplistic version of the architecture presented herein is provided by 
the Active Network Working Group's recent draft RFC entitled Architectural 
Framework for Active Networks Version 1.0 [11]. The purpose of this Inter-
net draft is to identify the core set of active network components and services 
prior to standardisation. Accordingly, active network architectures can be 
represented by the following general components: 
• Active applications 
• Packet languages (optional) 
• Execution environments, which consist of: 
An active network daemon/service 
An implementation language 
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Active Applications 
Acllve Network D D Daemon lmplementallon 
Language v v 
Active Node I ll 
Physical Network 
Figure 2.1: A general model of the core active network components. 
- A physical network host/active node 
• A virtual network (optional) 
• A physical network 
Additionally, frameworks exist to formally verify the safety of packet lan-
guages. Similarly, frameworks also exist to ensure the security of an entire 
active network, ranging from bootstrapping the active nodes to authenti-
cating packets of data. Finally, several protocols and published interfaces 
are defined to facilitate communication between the components of an active 
network. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, the above components and 
frameworks are discussed with reference to relevant implementations. 
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2.3 Existing Architectures 
This section introduces the architectures that form the basis for current active 
network research. As will be revealed, some architectures address the primary 
goals of active network research, such as functionality, performance, and 
security, whilst others focus on one specific area. All of the architectures 
listed are part of the DARPA active network research body, and are presented 
in order of the first known publication date. 
For the majority of the architectures discussed in this section, few ob-
jective details have been given by the respective authors regarding the type 
and bounds of the equipment used and the underlying network structure. 
This leaves many characteristics of the architecture unresolved, particularly 
in terms of performance and security. Subsequently, the issue of achieving an 
objective and thorough evaluation o{an active network architecture forms 
the basis for Chapter 3: Unresolved Issues of Active Networks. 
2.3.1 ANTS 
The ANTS active network was introduced in April 1996, and is possibly 
the most adaptable (if not the most researched) architecture of today [52]. 
The architecture was initially packet-based [51], meaning that the specialised 
routing and processing instructions are carried within the header of each 
packet. The opposite approach is that of node-based architectures, where pre-
specified code modules at each active node process the packets that contain 
relevant reference(s) in the packet header (an example of such a system is 
presented in Section 2.3.5). However, the latest version of ANTS uses a code 
module caching system to avoid sending duplicate code modules. 
The ANTS architecture is implemented in Java, providing many of ANTS's 
distributed functions natively. Code modules can be user-defined, which re-
quires an ANTS safety thread to be running constantly in the background, 
handling any code module that consumes excessive resources, such as CPU 
time and memory beyond the pre-specified limits. The routing API, as pro-
vided by the architecture, offers only a limited set of commands to provide 
security at active nodes. The Java run-time libraries also attempt to protect 
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Figure 2.2: The rate of throughput for a single-hop data transfer for the 
ANTS architecture using various buffer sizes. 
out-of-process resources, with the exception of shared memory that may be 
utilised by all users. 
Applications including multicasting [10], mobile host accommodation [28], 
and congestion control [6] have been implemented using the ANTS architec-
ture, proving the concept that such applications can be implemented using 
such a framework. However, the latest version of the system (version 2.0) 
only claims a maximum throughput of 18 Mbps, as presented in Figure 2.2. 
Additionally, latencies above 700f-ls are also experienced when buffer sizes 
exceed 1,100 bytes, as can be seen from Figure 2.3. Despite the unimpres-
sive performance, ANTS has proven to be a very useful (and hence highly 
utilised) framework for implementing and testing first-generation active net-
work applications and protocols. 
2.3.2 Netscript 
The Netscript project, as introduced by Yemini and da Silva [54] in April 
1996, focuses primarily on providing a simple programmable network with 
efficiency as a key priority. This allows the network vendors to install new 
routing protocols with the same ease as a user installs and runs a new appli-
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Figure 2.3: The latency of data packets for the ANTS architecture using 
various buffer sizes. 
cation on an end-node. Netscript achieves this goal by providing a minimal 
set of primitives for agents (otherwise known as a dynamically dispatched 
and remotely executed program) to call in order to accomplish advanced 
network processing and routing. 
The architecture that transports Netscript agents is referred to as a 
Netscript Virtual Network (NVN). An NVN consists of two entities: Virtual 
Network Engines (VNEs) and Virtual Links (VLs). Whilst VNEs appear to 
be analogous to active nodes, and VLs appear to be analogous to physical 
links between active nodes, the architecture states that several independent 
VNEs may reside on any given device in the network, maintaining their own 
separate information bases. Additionally, VLs can also represent any num-
ber of physical network links, which is particularly applicable to multicasting. 
Hence, the composition of an NVN is only loosely coupled with the underly-
ing physical network. As the VEs in the network store and execute the agent 
scripts, Netscript appears to be a node-based active network architecture. 
Due to the restrictive nature of the Netscript language, agents tend to 
perform only lightweight duties such as network management and external 
protocol analysis/profiling. Consequently, Netscript provides an ideal alter-
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native to traditional means of network management such as remote SNMP 
monitoring. The volume of traffic generated by remote SNMP makes pro-
filing large networks impractical, whereas Netscript agents can provide an 
unbounded array of monitoring options without having to probe a remote 
SNMP Management Information Base (MIB). This concept was later ex-
panded to provide lightweight Netscript agents to implement SNMP func-
tions, ranging from managing the MIB to setting user-requested SNMP traps. 
2.3.3 Liquid Software 
The Liquid Software project was introduced in November 1996 by Hartman 
et al. [21]. Instead of immediately developing a new framework, the aim 
of this research is to develop software and software systems that can easily 
flow from one node to another, with potentially no additional constraints 
or modifications to the underlying network and operating systems. It is 
envisaged that the Liquid Software system will enable active networks rather 
than implement them. According to the authors, networks built using Liquid 
Software will be easier to maintain, debug, and update. 
Current research by the Liquid Software group focuses on methods to pro-
vide portable code, and methods to interpret or compile intermediate code 
in a just-in-time nature to adhere to performance constraints. An API is 
currently being developed, which will take into account the large number 
of operating systems and architectures for which the system will be imple-
mented. It is expected that the API will also take into account common 
security routines, which the system must enforce. It must be noted that at 
this stage of the research, the project is investigating the requirements that 
comprise the core set of API routines, rather than focusing on specific system 
implementations. 
2. 3.4 The Switch ware Project 
Whilst the Switchware project was first presented by Smith et al. [47] in 
1997, the paper written by Alexander et al. [2] in May 1998 introduced the 
main features of the architecture. To address security issues, the Switchware 
project of May 1998 presented a layered approach to providing a flexible, 
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yet safe and secure network. Layers in the architecture consist of specialised 
active packets, active extensions, and a secure active node infrastructure. 
As the host language for Switchware's active packets, the PLAN language 
was created to meet the project's safety requirements (see Section 2.5.1). To 
implement the secure active node infrastructure, the SANE environment was 
developed with various features such as a secure boot-loader and the verifica-
tion of system integrity via cryptographic authentication (see Section 2.4.1). 
Nested between the active node infrastructure and the PLAN active packets 
is the active extensions layer. This layer is required to provide additional 
functionality to the active packets due to the restrictive nature of the PLAN 
language primitives. Converse to the inline routing instructions of Switch-
ware active packets, more powerful active extensions are installed on specific 
nodes in the network by an administr:ator, with access to active extensions 
controlled by the underlying SANE environment. 
The Switchware project employs a language-based approach to maintain-
ing security. In further detail, the concepts of proof carrying code, static and 
dynamic type checking, and program verification are employed to verify that 
code modules in both active packets and active extensions have not been 
altered from their original state. All active nodes in the architecture per-
form such static and dynamic checks on code modules, as well as performing 
various other authentication tasks. 
To prove the concept of the Switchware architecture, the PlanET envi-
ronment was created to emulate a medium-sized WAN, consisting of seven 
nodes and a source-to-destination hop-count of four [24). It was shown that 
by using a relatively simple architecture with limited flexibility, end-to-end 
throughput rates of up to 40 Mbps on a 100 Mbps Ethernet link is possible 
(as presented in Figure 2.4 using a four-hop network). However, the issue of 
an increase in latency per hop was not resolved, as is evident in Figure 2.5. 
Subsequent to these initial trials, new objectives in terms of security, perfor-
mance, and functionality were defined, which marked the start of develop-
ment for the SNAP packet language (see Section 2.5.2), with the eventual 
introduction of the SNAPd active network environment (see Section 2.3.8). 
Finally, the Switchware project also introduced the ANEP protocol in the 
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Figure 2.4: The rate of throughput for multiple-hop data transfer for the 
PlanET architecture using a 1,500 byte buffer size. 
form of an RFC, in an attempt to standardise active network research and 
architectures for future interoperability (see Section 2. 7.2 for a description of 
the ANEP protocol). Subsequently, the ANEP protocol has been used by the 
BOWMAN node operating system (see Section 2.3.7) and the SmartPackets 
architecture (see Section 2.3.6) among other more recent architectures. 
2.3.5 PAN 
The PAN active network implementation was introduced in April1998 by Ny-
gren [35]. The system is very much a hybrid of the ANTS system with 
a focus of high performance. If anything, the PAN architecture provides 
evidence that software based active networks can achieve as little as 13% 
overhead when forwarding packets over a single active node. However, both 
functionality and security were compromised to provide such results. 
The PAN active network differs little from the standard IP kernel modules 
that are found in typical operating systems such as Unix and Windows NT. 
Not only is it highly unsafe to allow user-defined instructions to be executed 
in kernel mode (as acknowledged by the author), the claim that the system 
supports multiple code systems is not as convincing as first thought. The 
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Figure 2.5: The latency of multiple-hop ping packets for the PlanET archi-
tecture using a 1,500 byte buffer size. 
architecture only supports the a. out and ELF linking formats, which are 
specific to Unix and its hybrids. As explained in Section 2.6.3, alternative 
frameworks such as middleware provide true multiple code systems. Whilst 
the architecture certainly performs well, the author does not describe what 
sort of active processing (if any) is possible from the architecture, and there 
is no mention of specialised routing or processing in the presentation of the 
architecture's results. 
As presented in Figure 2.6, only in kernel mode did the system perform 
well in terms of data throughput. Performance in terms of low latency rates 
was also favourable to the kernel implementation of the PAN architecture, 
as presented in Figure 2.7. As the PAN architecture only performed well 
in kernel mode, it is difficult to argue that the system is a functional, yet 
safe, active network implementation-as opposed to simply an enhanced (and 
fundamentally unsafe) network driver. It is unreasonable to assume that an 
active network architecture can scale to the speed of the PAN architecture by 
making a few minor adjustments-it would require a major system redesign 
with unacceptable security and functionality compromises to match PAN's 
performance levels. 
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2.3.6 SmartPackets 
Much like Netscript, the SmartPackets architecture focuses on the manage-
ment of programmable nodes, with particular focus on a lightweight imple-
mentation that adheres to strict security considerations. The architecture, 
as introduced by BNN Technologies in March 1999, demonstrates just how 
well-suited active networks are to network management. 
According to the authors [46], the architecture improves the management 
of large and complex networks by: 
1. Allowing management points to be located closer to the actual node(s) 
being managed. 
2. Retrieving specific characteristics from a node for analysis purposes, 
rather than performing exhaustive activity polling. 
3. Abstracting the concepts of management to actual constructs of the 
SmartPackets language, allowing fine-tuned network control. 
The SmartPackets architecture has demonstrated substantially more power 
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various buffer sizes. 
for performing SNMP routines than is possible with conventional implemen-
tations. For the manipulation and querying of MIBs, the SmartPacket ar-
chitecture can provide elegant event-based monitoring to support network 
management rather than using the brute-force methods of activity polling. 
The SmartPackets architecture is constructed from four entities: a spec-
ification for the format of smart packets (and their encapsulation into the 
host network), a specification of the languages that produce the compressed 
encoding of the executable packet, a virtual machine to provide a context 
in which SmartPackets are interpreted and executed, and finally, a security 
model. SmartPackets are encapsulated within the ANEP protocol to allow 
integration into existing IP networks. Under the SmartPackets architecture, 
IP routers check the Router Alert IP header option and forward ANEP pack-
ets to the SmartPackets ANEP daemon, which then hands the packets to the 
relevant network management program or virtual machine for processing. 
Four types of packets exist in the SmartPackets architecture. Program 
packets carry the executable code to the virtual machines that reside on 
the active hosts. Data packets carry the result of the subsequent processing 
back to the caller-which could be a host application or another active node. 
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Message packets carry pure information, such as MIB entries, as opposed to 
executable programs or program results. Finally, error packets carry error 
codes and unhandled exceptions thrown from active nodes upon failure of 
the network or program execution. 
Specialised languages were developed to host SmartPackets instructions. 
A high-level C-like language called Sprocket was implemented to provide fa-
miliar and simple program packet development. Most of the C keywords have 
been retained, but unnecessary constructs, such as typedefs and structures, 
were removed. A Sprocket compiler is then invoked to output Spanner code, 
which closely resembles assembly code. Of course, Spanner code can be de-
veloped by hand, but it is much more likely that any functional Program 
Packet is first written in the Sprocket language with the resultant Spanner 
code being hand-optimised where necessary, if performance is the key objec-
tive. 
Spanner code is interpreted and executed by the virtual machines that 
reside on the network's active nodes. Execution of such code is considered 
relatively safe due to the tight set of primitives available, the restriction 
of memory access to only the in-process stack and local variables (no heap 
access is permitted), and the lack of dangerous constructs and type-unsafe 
variables as found in the C language. 
The SmartPackets security model provides authentication in the form of 
cryptographic hashes on all packets, as well as access control lists to restrict 
the invocation of privileged virtual machine instructions. If any authorisa-
tion or authentication event fails, the instructions in the related packet are 
executed with low privileges to avoid compromising the active nodes or the 
state of the network. 
2.3. 'l BOWMAN 
The BOWMAN architecture was officially presented in March 2000 by Merugu 
et al. [32], as a joint venture between the University of Maryland, the Univer-
sity of Kentucky, and the Georgia Institute of Technology. The BOWMAN 
architecture represents a node operating system, on top of which composable 
active network elements can be built (a collection of such elements that form 
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an active network implementation is known as an Execution Environment). 
BOWMAN is constructed on top of a standard host operating system, 
and provides abstractions of low-level operating system functions for execu-
tion environments through the N odeOS API. The current implementation 
is for System-V Unix, but a port for any POSIX-compliant hybrid of Unix 
is possible. Additionally, BOWMAN implements a subset of the emerging 
DARPA Node OS interface (see Section 2.7.3). 
From BOWMAN's perspective, the users of the architecture are the ex-
ecution environments that make requests via BOWMAN to the underlying 
operating system objects. Typical requests are in the form of transmission 
scheduling, CPU cycle reservation, global state updates and queries (such 
as route tables and shared memory), and storage requests. To clarify, exe-
cution environment is the term given for an active network implementation 
that calls upon the BOWMAN NodeOS to provide basic end-to-end services 
and/ or provide some form of network programmability. Finally, active appli-
cations use the services of execution environments to send data with network 
service customisations. Hence, the role of BOWMAN is simply to provide 
a node operating system that safely supports any number of independent 
execution environments. 
The main design goals for BOWMAN are: the support for per-flow pro-
cessing with minimal overhead and fast packet processing, the provision of 
a fast-path to allow redundant processing to be bypassed, the provision of 
a global network architecture to support any number of virtual networks, 
and finally, the maintainance of reasonable performance for both packet for-
warding and packet processing. Results from recent trials of the BOWMAN 
architecture show that 100 Mbps rates of throughput are obtainable for IP 
payloads of only 1,400 bytes. As can be seen from from Figure 2.8, this 
throughput rate is only slightly less than that of most user-level C packet 
forwarders. Additionally, the BOWMAN architecture runs exclusively in 
user mode, which not only shows that the system is efficient, but it also has 
the potential to provide a high level of safety. 
The BOWMAN NodeOS makes three key abstractions, namely Channels, 
A-Flows, and State-Stores. As the name suggests, channels are simply links 
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Figure 2.8: The rate of throughput for a single-hop data transfer for the 
BOWMAN architecture using various buffer sizes. 
between endpoints in a BOWMAN virtual network, which can be created, 
modified, and deleted through the NodeOS API. Channels support a number 
of network and link-layer protocols. A-Flows represent independent points of 
computation within the network-each with their own execution context such 
as local variables, associated worker threads, and connected channels. Again, 
the NodeOS provides routines for the manipulation of A-Flows. Finally, 
State-Stores provide the information registry for all A-Flows on a given node, 
again with associated API routines. 
The BOWMAN architecture also provides BOWMAN Extensions. These 
extensions are usually in the form of routing protocols, queueing mechanisms, 
and other network services. Such services are invoked via BOWMAN system 
calls, and are available via the system API. 
The CANES Execution Environment 
The CANES execution environment utilises the BOWMAN NodeOS API to 
allow network programmability on a per-fiow basis. Active applications based 
upon the CANES execution environment include Active Error Recovery and 
Iterative gather-compute-scatter [31]. Results showed that only slight perfor-
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mance degradation was experienced at each active node. Whilst little other 
information is available about these applications, the OS-savvy interface pro-
vided by the BOWMAN API suggests that many complex applications are 
possible, with an underlying active node operating system that provides un-
precedented rates of throughput for any active network architecture. 
2.3.8 SNAPd 
The SNAPd system was introduced in April 2001 as part of a critical review 
of the current active packets paradigm [34]. As background information, the 
authors of the system claim that all active packet based networks do not offer 
a fully practical service, leading to the current inactivity of related research 
and development of active packet based architectures and applications. 
Following the critical review, the authors introduced a Practicality Frame-
work in order to assess the current packet based architectures in terms of 
safety, efficiency, and functionality. Subsequently, the SNAP packet lan-
guage was developed to address the shortfalls of the previous systems (see 
Section 2.5.2). The SNAPd architecture was then introduced as the daemon 
process to load and execute SNAP active packets. 
The SNAP packet language and the SNAPd host environment together 
form an architecture that addresses the issues of safety, efficiency, and func-
tionality. With 53 active node primitive instructions which closely resemble 
bytecodes, the system is not as expressive as other systems, but this does 
work to SNAPd's advantage in terms of safety and efficiency. Additionally, 
the architecture runs entirely in user mode, yet still yields up to 76 Mbps 
throughput, as presented in Figure 2.9. However, as Figure 2.10 reveals, 
the latency at each hop is over 50% greater than the rate incurred when 
performing conventional IP routing. 
The SNAPd environment is yet to be fully tested. The architecture has 
not yet been trialled with a realistically sized network, nor have any non-
trivial applications been developed or tested to prove the systems practicality 
(listed by the SNAPd authors as a key issue for all previous architectures). 
However, it must be stated that the SNAPd architecture is in its infancy, 
and given the fact that it can provide security and solid performance rates in 
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user address-space, the case for active-packet based networks has been given 
new light. 
2.4 Safety and Security Frameworks 
By virtue of programmable networks, new risks are associated with the net-
work endpoints, intermediate active nodes, and the very state of the network 
itself. Such risks reside in the form of unauthorised access to in-process 
or out-of-process data, and excessive memory, CPU cycle, and bandwidth 
consumption. Safe active networks protect known and trusted users and 
applications from breaching the specified bounds on such resources, where 
consumption is either malicious or in error. Secure active networks protect 
network resources from such over-consumption by untrusted users and appli-
cations. 
Whilst a well-designed active network architecture can enforce restrictions 
on network resource consumption (or minimise the effects when limitations 
are breached), recent advances in active networks have seen the introduction 
of active network-specific safety and security frameworks to formally verify 
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that a system is safe, or to enforce security on an existing architecture. This 
section presents two such frameworks. 
2.4.1 SANE 
The SANE (Secure Active Network Environment) provides a layered archi-
tecture for the construction of secure active network infrastructures. Based 
on a minimal set of trust assumptions and rules, the framework securely 
bootstraps the remainder of the system, providing authentication and nam-
ing services for active packets. This provides a foundation proved as secure 
for execution environments to run in, with guaranteed integrity of services. 
The Switchware project uses this environment as the basis for all security 
services, ranging from verification of the initial network state through to the 
authentication of remote packets. Additionally, the ANTS architecture can 
utilise the SANE framework for all security services [3]. 
Static checks are used to verify the state of the system following startup, 
via a secure boot-loading architecture. After verification of the system's 
integrity, SANE performs dynamic checks on a per-user or per-packet basis 
(a public/private key scheme for the authentication of trust relationships 
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is utilised). Security is maintained through inter-node authentication, the 
restriction of the execution environment (and the programs the execution 
environment evaluates), and the provision of a partitioned naming service for 
users, nodes, and packets. By associating procedure names and objects with 
access privileges, authorisation is possible throughout a distributed network. 
To maintain an efficient service, the SANE framework was designed to 
provide dynamic checks as quickly as possible, as they are performed most of-
ten. Static checks take considerably longer, but this is less important because 
such checks are normally performed once only, at system startup. Current 
research efforts of the SANE framework focus on developing optimal tradeoffs 
between costly static checks and inexpensive dynamic checks. Potentially, an 
expensive compile-time or boot-time static check could eliminate the need for 
current dynamic verification on a per-packet basis. 
The cost of authentication via the SANE framework appears to be ac-
ceptable (albeit there are no other frameworks to use as a comparison). By 
sending active ping packets, an authenticated ping took an average of 8~-ts, 
whilst an unauthenticated packet took 5j.-ts. Data packets performed worse, 
with a 28% degradation in performance for received packets, and a 62% 
degradation for sent packets. 
The SANE framework is well-suited to execution environments that do 
not provide their own security services, for a moderate degradation of perfor-
mance. Alternatively, the reliance on a safe packet language (see Section 2.5) 
may provide adequate safety. This is displayed by the PlanET architecture, 
where the PLAN packet language provides safety for program packets that 
do not require special privileges (23]. 
2.4.2 ActiveSpec 
ActiveSpec is a framework for the formal verification of security policies for 
active networks and their services (16], guaranteeing the integrity of an active 
network architecture. Through a formally defined set of services, policies, and 
resources, the interactions within an active network can be modelled with 
subsequent verification of security requirements. A framework is provided 
that allows the individual components of active networks to be specified under 
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various representations. Once the specifications have been defined, the PVS 
theorem prover is used to formally verify the properties under question [25]. 
The ActiveSpec framework requests a simple formal specification of active 
nodes (and their resources) and security policies, and verifies through PVS 
that packets have access to secure resources only if they present the correct 
permissions (the preservation of network resources such as bandwidth con-
sumption has not yet been addressed). This is achieved by monitoring the 
incoming and outgoing channels for any given packet, as well as monitoring 
the resources that the packet consumes (the state of the related active nodes 
is also checked after processing the packet). If any violation of resources 
occurs, the verification process returns an error. 
The ActiveSpec framework was used to model and formally verify the 
integrity of the boot-loading service for the SANE environment, guaranteeing 
a secure boot process for active network architectures that do not implement 
their own security mechanisms. Current research efforts for the ActiveSpec 
framework are concentrating on the extension of the system to verify packet 
delivery and packet evaluation primitives for generic architectures. 
2.5 Packet Languages 
As made apparent during the implementation of architectures such as the 
Switch Ware project and SNAPd, languages specific to active networks could 
prove important in addressing key issues such as safety, portability, flexibility, 
and efficiency. Such languages attempt to make the execution of arbitrary 
user instructions on active nodes safer by restricting the dangerous constructs 
of conventional languages, and by placing bounds on the resources that a 
program may request. 
Whilst architectures such as ANTS attempt to provide holistic environ-
ments to cater for all demands that active applications place on their host 
networks, the introduction of active network-specific languages permits a 
looser coupling between the underlying network architecture and the net-
work interface that the active application calls upon. This section presents 
several such active network-specific languages. 
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2.5.1 PLAN 
PLAN (Packet Language for Active Networks) is a lightweight language 
which acts as a replacement to packet headers in a conventional network 
(packet headers themselves can be viewed as very restricted programs) [22]. 
PLAN programs are very restricted in functionality (only a handful of primi-
tives exist), but they are also permitted to call a second level of node-resident 
executable code known as service routines. Such service routines are normally 
written in more powerful native languages to provide core network functions. 
The language itself is based on lambda calculus, with a very simple gram-
mar and only twelve data-types, five primitives, and the ability to define and 
call PLAN-based functions (which can optionally raise exceptions). Primi-
tives such as OnRemote and OnNeighbor allow service routines to be run at 
either the next hop in the active network or at the specified end-point. After 
a host application constructs a PLAN packet, it is injected into the network 
via a port on which the PLAN interpreter is listening. All communication 
between the active network and the host application is performed via this 
port. 
To address safety issues, any program written in PLAN is guaranteed 
to observe the user-defined bounds on resources, in particular network band-
width, memory, and CPU cycle usage. Additionally, the language is type- and 
pointer-safe, providing strong static guarantees that the PLAN interpreter 
can not be manipulated to perform arbitrary operations. Additionally, con-
currently executing programs cannot interfere with each other because the 
PLAN language is stateless. 
Security issues have not yet been addressed, but the restrictive nature of 
the PLAN language implies that compromises in security will not compromise 
the entire state of the network. According to the authors, it is envisaged 
that security services from active network host environments will provide 
protection and authentication where necessary, such as that offered by the 
SANE environment (see Section 2.4.1). 
The design principle of the language is to include only core functionality-
features of the language that are considered necessary and that also impose 
no safety risks. Subsequently, constructs such as recursion and unbounded 
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iteration have been removed. This, coupled with an automatically decrement-
ing resource counter, suggests that all PLAN programs terminate, albeit the 
programs are restricted in expressibility and functionality. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the PlanET active network was trialled 
using the SANE host environment and the PLAN packet language, with 
throughput rates reaching 48 Mbps on a 100 Mbps Ethernet network. Con-
sidering that this network was built from the ground up (no underlying IP 
layer was used), PLAN promises to be a safe and flexible language in which 
to build active applications. 
2.5.2 SNAP 
The authors of the SNAP packet language (Safe Networking with Active 
Packets) claim that SNAP is the first language to be both safe and effi-
cient [33]. Whilst PLAN is a safe packet language, the authors of SNAP 
argue that performance evaluation of PLAN reveals that PLAN is too ineffi-
cient to be utilised at every active node in end-to-end communication. Hence, 
SNAP was developed to provide both safety and efficiency, with initial results 
indicating that these goals have been achieved (up to 80 Mbps throughput 
can be achieved in the SNAPd host environment, executing SNAP program 
packets in user mode). 
The scheme of the language provides a simple set of primitives that are 
then compiled to byte-code, ready for injection into the active network. The 
limited expressibility of the language has allowed the authors to assert safety 
theorems about all SNAP programs, guaranteeing the protection of network 
resources, in particular the safety of CPU, memory, and bandwidth usage, 
as well as guaranteeing the isolation of separate processes. Additionally, this 
limited expressibility allows a high level of efficiency to be achieved, with no 
substantial degradation of performance at each network hop. 
Similar to the PLAN language, SNAP programs are guaranteed to ter-
minate, but with the enhancement that they also run in time that is linear 
to the program length. Additionally, particular attention has been paid to 
developing the SNAP language in order to permit a fast interpretation by 
active nodes. One of the most notable features of the language is that all 
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stack values are located at 32 bit offsets, reducing byte-alignment overheads 
during interpretation. 
As mentioned previously, the SNAPd interpreter follows the formal se-
mantics of the SNAP language to safely interpret program packets. The 
SNAPd interpreter runs entirely in user mode, utilising UDP for packet trans-
mission. After implementing a SNAP version of the ICMP ping program, 
the language was tested on a five hop, six node IP-based network, using the 
standard Linux kernel router as a comparison. 
Of the more notable results, the SNAP latencies were very similar to 
those of the benchmark latencies. Whilst the kernel mode benchmark could 
saturate a 100 Mbps network with a 500 byte packet size, SNAP obtained 
an 80 Mbps throughput rate once the packet size reached 1,500 bytes. Not 
surprisingly, profiling revealed that the copying of data from user address 
space into kernel address space accounted for the majority of the overhead, 
suggesting that a kernel mode SNAP interpreter will provide performance 
similar to that of the Linux kernel router. 
As a final comment on the issue of functionality, the authors of the SNAP 
packet language are currently working towards a PLAN-to-SNAP compiler. 
This will enable a new level of operability between active applications and 
active networks, as well as presenting several new research possibilities. 
2.5.3 SafeTCL 
Whilst the SafeTCL scripting language [37] has not yet been utilised by 
any of the surveyed architectures, the language did provide a precedent for 
a secure language in an untrusted public environment such as the Internet. 
The designers of SafeTCL determined a set of unsafe features in the language, 
and then disabled them from being interpreted. Additionally, any features of 
the language that had the potential to consume resources (such as the puts 
command in which disk space or memory can be written to) could now be 
overridden within a program to impose user-specified bounds. 
SafeTCL implements a simple padded cell model to protect the underlying 
operating system from unauthorised access and resource consumption, much 
in the same way as a modern operating system protects its own user processes. 
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This, coupled with a restrictive core set of primitives, provides a safe scripting 
language to embed into applets and other web-based applications. 
To address security, data and code are semantically grouped together, re-
sulting in an overall reduction in the amount of security-aware code required. 
This design principle was motivated by the recent merging of data and code 
in Internet based services such as email. Additionally, SafeTCL modularises 
its security policies to decouple security constraints from the associated code. 
This results in unrestricted access to security policies for analysis and design 
purposes, and subsequently promotes the reuse and composition of existing 
policies. 
One very important characteristic of the SafeTCL language is that it 
can be compiled into native machine code, and/ or call or be called from C, 
resulting in high performance code modules. This is important, as a future 
active network architecture could compile SafeTCL source-code at run-time 
on demand-maintaining machine independence yet offering an expressive, 
secure, and efficient active network. 
2.6 Host Implementation Languages 
Previous studies of active networks have shown that the selected implemen-
tation language can have a substantial effect on the performance, function-
ality, and security of the given architecture [35, 52, 33, 22, 21, 26]. All of the 
high-performance architectures surveyed in this chapter implemented their 
packet interpreters (otherwise referred to as execution environments) in the 
languages of C and C++, whilst the remainder of the architectures used Java. 
This section discusses the characteristics of the above-mentioned languages, 
followed by a brief introduction to a new programming paradigm for active 
networks-that of middleware and distributed systems programming. 
2.6.1 C and C++ 
If performance of an active network architecture is a key issue, then it is 
likely that the implementation language will be C. C++ offers reuse benefits 
in the form of inheritance, design benefits in the form of improved modu-
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larity, and autonomy in the form of polymorphism, but these benefits come 
at a cost-applications that utilise such features of C++ usually incur a per-
formance penalty with a range of 10%-25% when compared with a pure C 
implementation. 
Embedded C and C++ compilers exist for most architecture and operating 
system combinations; subsequently most routing devices utilise a subset of 
either language, albeit a proprietary subset for most vendors. Additionally, 
most operating systems allow user-defined applications to access system calls 
via C interfaces, which enable active networks to perform low-level operations 
such as direct communication with network interfaces, direct memory access, 
and inter-process communication. 
Security is not provided by C or C++; the languages are not type-safe, 
meaning that one type can be substituted for another in various ways, either 
to provide flexibility or simply in error. Arbitrary segments in memory can 
be accessed, and depending on the operating system, results could be catas-
trophic. Obviously, additional safety checks must be imposed if an active 
network is to accept C program packets. Finally, development time using C 
and C++ is usually much longer than other high-level, network-centric lan-
guages, such as Java or TCL. 
2.6.2 Java 
The main barrier to Java's success as the leading implementation language 
for active network architectures is that of performance. Even under fast hard-
ware (dual Intel Pentium Ills, 512Mb primary memory), applications written 
in Java are noticeably slower than natively-compiled languages, suggesting 
that the price paid in performance is constant due to run-time overheads, re-
gardless of the hardware specification. Whilst just-in-time and ahead-of-time 
Java compilers exist [48], currently only a 5%-20% increase in performance 
is possible. The poor performance of Java in terms of latency is evident in 
the ANTS active network implementation [52]. 
Performance appears to be the only shortcoming of Java. Java is network-
centric, meaning that network functionality that had to be hand-coded using 
C is standard with any release of Java. Additionally, using Java's Remote 
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Method Invocation interface (RMI), classes can be written and bytecode-
compiled by network users, inserted into active packets, and then interpreted 
by any active node that has access to a Java interpreter. Furthermore, us-
ing Java's Reflection API, arbitrary classes can be received and inspected 
by active nodes, requiring only minimal constraints on the format of active 
packets. The technique of object reflection forms the basis of a related re-
search project by Curran and Parr [15], where arbitrary classes are loaded 
and executed to perform QoS routines for a multimedia server. 
As noted by Krupxzak et al. [26], Java is well-suited to the deployment 
of new active network protocols because of its network, run-time type in-
formation, and portability features. Additionally, safety is another of Java's 
favourable characteristics. Not only is Java relatively type-safe, the elimina-
tion of raw memory pointers from the language means that arbitrary memory 
cannot be accessed directly, making it increasingly difficult to compromise 
the state of the running program and/or the underlying interpreter. The 
experienced Java programmer can still exploit anomalies in the Java virtual 
machine specification to compromise system safety (anomalies such as op-
timisations made to visibility checking), but Java still offers a vast safety 
improvement over compiled languages such as C. 
2. 6. 3 Distributed Systems and Middleware 
Whilst Chapter 4 provides a detailed overview of middleware frameworks and 
distributed systems, it is worthwhile noting the importance of such platforms 
when discussing active network implementation languages. Several recent 
active networks, programmable networks, and distributed QoS frameworks 
have utilised middleware frameworks (such as CORBA) for at least part of 
their system's implementation [4, 17, 42, 28]. 
Middleware frameworks such as COM and CORBA offer inherent support 
for the registration, loading, execution, and control of user-defined classes-
attributes that most active network architectures attempt to implement inter-
nally. Additionally, both CORBA and extended COM (referred to as DCOM) 
offer enhanced distributed object services, such as remote method invocation 
and inter-host communication via distributed event handling. Java's remote 
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method invocation API also provides solid distributed application support. 
Both the COM and CORBA communities have also endeavoured to make 
their middleware environments as secure as possible, due to the potentially 
dangerous task of running remote processes. Accordingly, both frameworks 
offer a rich set of routines to govern the conditions in which remote processes 
can be started, accessed, and terminated. Additionally, levels of resource 
usage can usually be monitored, if not restricted, with a fine level of granu-
larity over the interaction with the remote host running the process. Finally, 
both frameworks offer support for the marshalling of arbitrary data, includ-
ing the serialisation and distribution of objects between several hosts, which 
is well-suited to the demands of active network infrastructures. 
Given the close match in terms of services between those that middleware 
frameworks offer and those which active network implementations require, it 
is surprising that no previous active network architectures have fully utilised 
the services of middleware frameworks. Consequently, Chapter 4 presents 
such an architecture. 
2. 7 Specialised Protocols and Interfaces 
The previous sections in this chapter have described the typical active net-
work architectures and the various components within, yet the aspect of 
connectivity within and between active networks has not been addressed. 
Hence, this section presents the draft protocols and interfaces proposed by 
the active network research community to provide a standard for both the 
inter- and intra-operability of active network architectures. 
It should be noted that all the protocols and interfaces presented in this 
section are still draft documents, with considerable current research attempt-
ing to identify the core set of services and routines required to finalise these 
proposals as official standards. 
2. 7.1 Programmable Network Interfaces 
In the context of active networks, it is worth noting the IEEE P1520 stan-
dards initiative for programmable network interfaces [7]. The IEEE P1520 
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working group introduced a draft standard for a networking application pro-
gramming interface in January 1999, which, in part, is intended to assist the 
facilitation of active network policies via various P1520 interfaces and op-
tions. Not only active packets can be transmitted via a P1520 interface; for 
example, video transcodings could be specified within a class of a multicast 
tree, supporting hosts with varying transmission and decoding rates. 
As an overview of the P1520 draft standard, it is envisaged that all hard-
ware devices will support a minimal set of interfaces at several different layers 
to provide open systems communication, primarily for ATM and IP routers 
(see Figure 2.11), as well as for switches and bridges. The objective is to de-
velop an open system for signalling and device management/control, as well 
as higher level multimedia services on networks. By leveraging a distributed 
object oriented approach, third-party service providers can rapidly integrate 
new protocols, and hardware vendors will be decoupled from the software 
requirements. 
The importance of the P1520 standard for active networks is that a well-
known set of interfaces will be provided, allowing communication with exe-
cution environments, which could become a global hardware standard upon 
finalisation. However, in some ways the standard could also challenge ac-
tive networks as the new paradigm for providing programmable networks, as 
the standard proposes a layered architecture very much in parallel with that 
of current active network architectures, ranging from the physical elements 
through to high-level APis, to provide personalised end-user applications and 
services. A more likely scenario would be the adaptation of the P1520 inter-
faces into proprietary hardware, with the implementation of active network 
services through well-known P1520 interfaces. 
2. 7. 2 The Active Network Encapsulation Protocol 
All execution environments within active networks must determine and clas-
sify active packets, yet the issue of how such classification is performed has, 
up until recently, been implemented in an arbitrary manner by the various ac-
tive network architectures. In July 1997, the Active Network Encapsulation 
Protocol (ANEP) was introduced as a draft RFC, to encourage a standard-
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Figure 2.11: Mapping of the P1520 architecture to IP routers/switches [7]. 
ised active packet frame format [1]. 
The ANEP protocol was primarily proposed to provide a formal mecha-
nism for the encapsulation and transmission of active network frames. En-
capsulated frames can be transmitted over network infrastructures such as 
IPv4 or IPv6, or transmitted directly over the link layer, as presented in Fig-
ure 2.12. Additionally, the ANEP format is as general as possible to allow 
the co-existence of different execution environments, promoting both extensi-
bility and ongoing active packet research. A simplified format also allows an 
efficient demultiplexing of received packets, and provides existing network-
layer routers with a straightforward adaptation of the ANEP protocol. 
An additional benefit from such an encapsulation protocol is that devices 
that support ANEP will only be subjected to minimal default processing 
when a requested execution environment is not available. Also, information 
that does not fit conventionally into active packets (such as active network 
security messages) can be processed by ANEP-aware devices, much in the 
same way that ICMP messages are encapsulated within IP packets. 
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Figure 2.12: Possible ANEP-encapsulated packet flows through an active 
node [12]. 
ANEP-compliant execution environments will place data from an active 
application and/ or code modules into the payload of one or more ANEP 
frames. Options in the ANEP header include authentication, confidential-
ity, and integrity information. Type identifier fields are initialised with the 
identification of the relevant execution environment. It is the responsibility 
of the active network architecture to deliver the packet to the appropriate 
active node, but because the ANEP protocol is encapsulated, IP is normally 
used to deliver ANEP active packets. 
It should be noted that execution environments that support ANEP pack-
ets can also process non-active packets. For example, if a non-active applica-
tion sends a legacy packet, the execution environment could proxy the pack-
ets via newly formed ANEP packets, much in the way split-media routers 
transport streams between network borders using differing protocols. Alter-
natively, the execution environment could establish a private channel that 
uses a legacy network protocol to provide default forwarding services for the 
encapsulated packets. 
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2. 1.3 The Node OS Interface 
Following the IETF Active Network Working Group's first version of the 
architectural framework for active networks [11], the NodeOS Interface Spec-
ification for active node operating systems was proposed to establish well-
known core active node services [39]. Benefits from such an interface standard 
include the ability for a single node to support multiple languages due to the 
separation of the operating system and the execution environment, and the 
ability to rapidly port a node operating system to new hardware types. 
The N odeOS Interface Specification defines a basic set of functions to ac-
cess and manage abstractions of the resources associated with an active node, 
including communication, memory, and computational resources. Hence, the 
N odeOS acts as a layer between the execution environments and the un-
derlying physical resource13. The primary role of the interface is to support 
packet forwarding, with a secondary role of executing active packets (this is 
primarily the role of the execution environments that call the NodeOS in-
terface). The NodeOS interface is based upon the concept of packet flows, 
which implies that packet processing, admission control, and accounting is 
performed on a per-flow basis. 
It is not assumed that all N odeOS implementations will support the same 
set of routines. Although all implementations must support the core set of 
routines, many NodeOSs will provide additional interfaces and routines that 
specialised execution environments will call upon. The main requirement 
for a NodeOS implementation is that packets are forwarded as rapidly as 
possible-in hardware if packets are non-active. Finally, whenever a NodeOS 
implementation requires a service that is not governed by existing active 
network specifications, the N odeOS should refer to established conventions 
such as POSIX. 
The N odeOS specification also incorporates security. Requests made to a 
node operating system on behalf of a particular user, application, or service 
must be accompanied by credentials sufficient to verify that they originated 
from an entity authorised by the active node and/or execution environment. 
However, like most interface specifications, no direction is given regarding 
how such authentication is to be performed-this is left to the implementors. 
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As mentioned in Section 2.3.7, the BOWMAN node operating system 
implements the current draft set of NodeOS routines, with throughput rates 
that come close to saturating a 100 Mbps Ethernet network, and with only 
slight performance degradation at each additional network hop. Whilst this 
is the only known implementation of the NodeOS interface, the favourable re-
sults, coupled with the benefits of an active network-aware operating system, 
strengthen the case for a standardised active network foundation. 
2. 7.4 Protocol Boosters 
Protocol boosters are robust protocol adaptors designed to dynamically im-
prove the performance of protocols in heterogeneous distributed computing 
systems, on an end-to-end basis [29]. A protocol booster compliments an ex-
isting protocol by adding, deleting, delaying, or modifying selected protocol 
messages and/ or payloads, but a protocol booster is not permitted to replace 
or terminate the existing protocol. The motivation for the development of 
protocol boosters is as follows: many protocols involve inefficiencies when 
they are applied as general purpose solutions to the delivery of application 
and network requirements, and protocol boosters fine tune such protocols to 
a specific environment. 
The traditional approach to protocol design methodology is to cater for 
the worst case scenario and suffer inefficiencies during normal protocol use. 
With the introduction of protocol boosters, protocols may be designed for 
average-case or best-case scenarios, with the dynamic loading of protocol 
adaptors to accommodate for worst-case scenarios-when they occur. Ad-
ditionally, such protocol adaptation allows for the optimisation of specific 
applications or network conditions. An example of the successful use of pro-
tocol boosters was in the form of a Forward Error Correction (FEC) protocol 
booster, used on a 155 Mbps ATM link running TCP /IP. When a Bit Error 
Rate (BER) of 10-4 or greater was introduced to the link, TCP completely 
stalled, but managed to operate normally with the FEC protocol booster. 
The application of protocol boosters on demand may be considered as a 
structured subset of active networking, given the presence of a programmable 
network infrastructure. Such protocol boosters could be easily deployed by 
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active networks, with no need to update the underlying infrastructure. 
2.8 Active Network Backbones 
Because of the increasing number of active network architectures and com-
ponents, the Active Network Working Group established a DARPA-funded 
testbed referred to as the ABone [5]. This infrastructure is intended to sup-
port the melding of related research projects, as well as to serve as a large 
virtual network for the deployment and testing of new protocols and services. 
The ABone is designed to be a sharable resource, open to all active net-
work researchers and environments. It utilises existing network links, includ-
ing the DARPA-funded CAIRN testbed. Internet overlays are used to link 
active nodes from remote sites (see Section 2.8.1). The ABone is intended to 
have high availability, with little or no pre-arrangement of service setup. 
Multiple node operating systems are also supported, although all are 
Unix-based thus far. The ABone provides a considerably large infrastruc-
ture, with the ability to support 1,000 active nodes at present. Security of 
the ABone is currently the responsibility of the local node administrators, 
who must ensure that their own site's security, and that of all others, can 
not be compromised. Finally, some central coordination is required to or-
ganise the deployment of new software and the ongoing maintainance of the 
network state. This is provided by a small organisation named the ABone 
Coordination Center (ABOCC), who are also DARPA funded. 
The basic components of the ABone consist of the permanent execution 
environments, the core active nodes and edge active nodes, and a naming 
and registration service maintained by the ABOCC. Additionally, the ANetD 
service exists on each active client node in the ABone network, which is used 
to install new execution environments, and performs global housekeeping 
functions such as event polling, packet demultiplexing for nodes that support 
multiple execution environments, and node management. 
Future work with the ABone will see the establishment of extensions to 
ANetD in order to close known security holes and implement stronger au-
thentication via digital signatures. The possibility of caching executable code 
is also being examined at present. The conversion of ANetD to a kernel-level 
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process is also being considered, to improve performance and support dy-
namically loadable kernel modules such as network device drivers. Finally, 
pushing AN etD down to the link layer will allow direct communication be-
tween ANEP and the network devices, improving performance by bypassing 
the IP stack altogether. 
2. 8.1 Internet Overlays 
Whilst the ABone infrastructure works transparently within the confines of 
the main DARPA testbed, some form of bridging mechanism is required to 
allow a distributed testbed for global convergence of active network architec-
tures and components. Accordingly, the Active Network Overlay Protocol 
(ANON) was introduced as a draft RFC in December 1997 (8). 
ANON allows the interconnection of ABone-based execution environ-
ments, in both point-to-point and bus topologies. The protocol is dynamic, 
hence execution environments and nodes can subscribe and sign-off at any 
time. ANON does not pre-empt existing or proposed active network routing 
or naming protocols, rather it simply supports a foundation to house such 
protocols. 
The ANON overlay performs the interconnection of remote active nodes 
via the ANEP encapsulation protocol. ANON network elements exchange 
packets via the ANEP addressing mechanisms, but ANON network elements 
do not forward ANON packets. Hence, if an incorrectly addressed packet 
arrives at an ANON-based remote site, it is silently discarded, as the un-
derlying ANEP mechanism is responsible for frame routing. Internal ANON 
routers are permitted to dispatch and relay packets with an execution en-
vironment, delivering the ANEP payload to the recipient in the form of an 
active packet. 
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Chapter III 
Unresolved Issues of Active Networks 
There are several unresolved issues of active networks-namely efficiency, 
functionality, and security. Unfortunately, these issues are also the key goals 
for active network research, indicating that new directions in the implemen-
tation of active networks may be required. Whilst many architectures can 
resolve two of the three key goals simultaneously, the remaining third goal 
tends to be compromised, 'limiting the total practicality of the given archi-
tecture. 
3.1 Efficiency 
Efficiency is the key area where active networks fail to achieve practical-
ity. Although only limited results have been published by active network 
researchers, it appears as if a marked deterioration in performance is likely 
when several network hops are made between the source and destination of 
a stream [24, 33]. 
3.1.1 Performance Ceilings 
Due to the lack of research into throughput rates for multiple hop active 
networks, it is difficult to characterise the general performance bounds com-
mon to active network architectures. However, from experiments performed 
on the PlanET architecture, it is apparent that a ceiling is imposed on the 
performance of the system after the first hop, regardless of implementation 
specifics (such as type of execution environment) [24]. 
By comparative results, this performance ceiling does not exist on passive 
networks. For example, after the second hop was visited on a 100 Mbps 
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Ethernet WAN, all PlanET active node traffic throughput rates had been 
limited to a maximum of 60 Mbps, whilst the non-active links maintained 
95 Mbps throughput. A likely explanation for this behaviour is the impact of 
data copying that must be performed by all active routers. From the second 
hop onwards, active routers must copy the data from the incoming interface, 
process the data, and then copy it to the outgoing interface. If each node 
in the test network has identical hardware specifications, it is likely that no 
further degradation in performance will be experienced on the downstream 
active nodes after the initial performance hit. 
3.1. 2 Performance Degradation 
It is expected that a level of degradation is to be incurred at each network hop 
because of the additional processing required, but the context switching from 
kernel to user mode, combined with multiple data copies per packet, means 
that most architectures can only provide a practical transport mechanism 
for small-scale networks. In addition, no results have been published where 
the effects of the number of hops on application data transfer have been 
measured-the status quo suggests that ping is a suitable application to infer 
an entire network's characteristics. Whilst ping is useful for testing latency, 
a more realistically sized benchmark such as file transfer is also required to 
provide insight into a network's performance under varying conditions. 
3.1. 3 Packet Classification Time 
Only the BOWMAN architecture has reported results from the analysis of 
applying multiple code modules per packet stream [32]. The results indicate 
that BOWMAN's packet classification system (the mechanism used to invoke 
code modules on candidate packets) is capable of classifying 1.3 x 105 packets 
per second with up to 256 code modules per packet. This is equivalent 
to a throughput of 1.5 Gbs, where typical 1,514 byte IP packets are used. 
Using BOWMAN as the only example, it could be assumed that the task of 
relating packets to requested code modules does not have a significant effect 
on performance of active networks. However, many more systems need to be 
trialled before this assumption can be asserted with any degree of confidence. 
45 
3.1.4 Packet Processing Time 
The amount of time an active node requires to process a packet according 
to its associated code modules has not yet been addressed by active network 
research. A weak inference could be made by looking at the throughput rates 
for various systems, but little mention is made of the actual active processing 
performed at each hop, or the number of hops associated with the throughput 
results. A suite of benchmarking routines would be beneficial to the objective 
analysis of packet processing performance, such as a compression routine, a 
sorting routine, and an encryption routine. 
3.1. 5 Processing Optimisations 
As emphasised by the development of node operating systems, packet pro-
cessing optimisations, by way of resource scheduling and alternative routing, 
can introduce considerable savings in terms of processing time [39, 32]. For 
example, the BOWMAN architecture provides a fast-path where special chan-
nels are established for packets that can be predetermined to require no addi-
tional processing, hence avoiding the costs of data copying, context switching, 
and multi-threaded processing. This technique is conceptually similar to that 
of IP Switching, where only the first packet in a stream is routed, and all 
following packets are labelled and then switched at wire speed. 
3.2 Functionality 
The functionality of active networks is difficult to quantify objectively. Whilst 
most active networks offer the same degree of processing options via their 
packet languages, the expressibility of the language determines the ease with 
which active applications can be developed. Additionally, functionality can 
be found in the level of control over packets and active routers in the network, 
as well as in the amount of effort required to deploy new code modules for 
node-based architectures. Usability, in terms of a simple yet powerful API 
for users and active applications, also defines the level of functionality within 
an architecture. 
Unfortunately, very few active networks give details on the above-mentioned 
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architectural features. Of notable findings, the ANTS architecture did pro-
vide a code-module deployment scheme, the PAN architecture gave full de-
tails of its user API, and both the PLAN and SNAP architectures gave the 
formal grammars of their packet languages. However, no architecture thus 
far has presented all details in terms of functionality. 
3. 2.1 Stream Granularity 
No architecture has discussed the level of granularity when defining the invo-
cation of code-modules on packets. For example, whilst most systems specify 
that a stream of data can be processed by a code module, no mention is made 
as to whether processing is performed on the outgoing data, the incoming 
data, or all packets in the stream. Additionally, the ability to enforce manda-
tory modules on all packets that are touted through an active node has not 
been discussed as of yet. On the other extreme of granularity, no system has 
discussed the possibility of specifying the invocation of code-modules on a 
packet-by-packet basis for node-based architectures. 
3.2.2 Packet Language Expressiveness 
The expressiveness of a packet language is the key characteristic in determin-
ing the functionality of an active network architecture. The easier it is to ac-
cess resources such as bandwidth, memory, and processors, the more rapidly 
active applications can be developed. Whilst less expressive languages tend 
to enhance security, restrictions are placed on the bounds of resultant code-
modules, unless experienced programmers devise low-level workarounds. The 
expressiveness of a language also has a strong correlation with code-module 
development times, using the migration from assembler to C as an example. 
3.2.3 Code Module Deployment 
The ability for application programmers to easily deploy code-modules is 
another indicator of the flexibility of a given active network environment. 
Unfortunately, only the ANTS architecture has provided details on code-
module deployment mechanisms. Disregarding the lack of research into such 
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deployment mechanisms, a system that allows extensive code-modules to 
be created for dynamic protocols, yet requires system down-time for such 
modules to be deployed, surely can not be considered truly flexible. 
3. 2.4 Usability 
Usability can be determined by the ease with which an active application can 
access and utilise the services of an active network architecture. For example, 
a complicated architecture with numerous conceptual components is not as 
usable as a simple architecture that provides the same services. Accordingly, 
a cohesive and simple API is considered more usable than one that offers 
many routines to perform the same task, with little consistency. The degree 
of run-time support to assist run-time debugging must also be considered 
when assessing the usabili~y of an architecture (33]. 
3.3 Safety and Security 
Ideally, the degree of safety offered by active networks must be at least equal 
to that of conventional IP [33]. However, it is very difficult to fulfil this claim, 
due to the increase in low-level programmatic control offered to end-users. 
As discussed in Section 2.5, considerable effort has been placed in protecting 
both the user and the underlying execution environment from programmatic 
errors or malicious use. However, the paradigm shift from a configurable 
network to one that is programmable inevitably leads to compromises in 
safety. The remainder of this section discusses such compromises. 
3. 3.1 Execution Privileges 
The instinctive means of addressing poor active network performance is to 
execute the architecture in kernel mode, eliminating context switches and 
double-handling of data. In fact, this is exactly what the PAN architecture 
does [35]. Unfortunately, safety and security are compromised under this 
regime, as most operating systems perform no address-space checks to verify 
that the requested resources are legally accessible by the user (as the user is 
in fact the operating system under kernel mode execution). Unless the active 
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network architecture can provide a verifiably safe language and execution en-
vironment in which to run user-defined code-modules in kernel mode, kernel 
mode execution of code-modules must be avoided. 
3.3.2 Resource Consumption 
Even the cornerstone of networking, IP, is not immune from excessive re-
source consumption. If the Time to Live header option is ignored by IP 
routers, an entire network can be flooded within seconds. Similarly, router 
convergence caused by spontaneous updates of OSPF route tables can also 
cripple a wide area network. However, active networks are exposed to more 
severe risks than the above problems, due to their highly programmable na-
ture. 
Active networks are susceptible to excessive resource consumption in the 
form of memory, processor time, and bandwidth, as initiated by user-defined 
code modules. Particular attention must not only be paid to emulating the 
stability of IP, but also to ensuring that excessive resource consumption 
on active nodes and network links does not occur. The ANTS architecture, 
among others, implements watchdog threads to inspect the resource consump-
tion for an active packet, with action taken to terminate the packet's exe-
cution if limits are breached. This is somewhat of a brute-force method to 
ensuring safety, and can most likely be compromised if the watchdog thread is 
attacked. Subsequently, other architectures rely on their restricted languages 
to block excessive memory consumption, but the experienced 'hacker' usually 
can find loopholes to such restrictions. In this light, node operating systems 
appear to be the most favourable to developers of active network architec-
tures, as the operating system itself can concentrate on resource allocation, 
based on pre-established policies. 
3. 3. 3 Memory Protection 
It is worthwhile at this stage to note the importance of memory protec-
tion. Whilst most modern operating systems found in both workstations and 
routers protect out-of-process memory access (with the exception of shared 
memory), it is the responsibility of the implementation language to protect 
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in-process memory usage (refer to Section 2.5 for a detailed discussion). For 
example, Java provides no mechanism to access arbitrary segments of mem-
ory, so no active packet implemented on a Java-based active node can inspect 
another active packet's data without permission. Conversely, the C language 
permits such access-which can only be addressed by providing a restricted 
alternative version of the language, as present in the SmartPackets architec-
ture. 
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Chapter IV 
COMAN: Motivation, Design, and Implementation 
This chapter introduces the COMAN active network architecture. The 
motivation for the development of the middleware-based architecture is pre-
sented, followed by a general overview of middleware technology. Next, the 
design of the architecture is outlined, including system configuration specifics 
and details of the core CO MAN application programmer interface. System 
implementation details and a source code listing for a sample client applica-
tion are also included. 
4.1 Motivation 
CO MAN was initially implemented to prove the case for a functional ac-
tive network architecture that could be rapidly developed via middleware. 
By using middleware services such as remote method invocation and in-
built data marshalling, key aspects of the architecture's functionality could 
be rapidly developed, without the need for duplicating existing code. By 
reusing existing services, the architecture could also remain relatively sim-
ple and unconstrained, as opposed to the more conventional active network 
architectures. 
4.2 Middleware Overview 
With the continued growth in network-based applications, distributed mid-
dleware systems (or object request brokers) of various incarnations have 
emerged to manage issues of complexity and scalability. Common middleware 
systems include CORBA [20] and DCOM [14], with both systems available 
on Unix and Windows platforms. Introduced by the Object Management 
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Group, CORBA is a well-specified distributed object protocol that is imple-
mented by various independent vendors, whereas Microsoft's DCOM repre-
sents a single entity consisting of a wire-protocol and a proprietary imple-
mentation. Java's Remote Method Invocation API is also gaining popularity 
as a web-based middleware system, with its system independence eliminating 
the requirement for platform specific implementations. 
The theme of managed distributed object creation, remote method in-
vocation, object persistence, and object termination is common to all dis-
tributed middleware systems. Accordingly, the application of middleware is 
suitable wherever complex distributed functionality is required. Middleware-
based systems are commonly utilised when using distributed processing to 
increase performance, or when implementing redundant links to increase sys-
tem reliability. From a design perspective, advantages of middleware systems 
include the separation of interface and implementation [18), support for ob-
jects with multiple interfaces, and location transparency. In the case of 
DCOM, language neutrality is also supported natively. 
4. 2.1 Existing Middleware-Based Distributed Frameworks 
Several middleware-based frameworks have been developed to increase the 
level of support for next-generation distributed applications. Whilst dis-
tributed middleware systems are well-suited to conventional client/server 
based applications, enhanced frameworks have been introduced to provide 
middleware-specific performance optimizations and QoS features [45]. One 
such framework, TAO, is a real-time object request broker which provides 
high-performance middleware components for common networking tasks, with 
multiple-layer QoS support [27]. TAO has recently been used to implement a 
framework which supports dynamically-specified transport protocols to sup-
port low latency, high bandwidth data streaming. Through the flexibility of 
its middleware composition, optimised scheduling and buffering techniques 
were utilised to provide low latency, high throughput video/audio links, sug-
gesting that middleware is a suitable mechanism to enable next generation 
distributed applications. 
A similar framework for middleware-based QoS support has been pro-
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posed by Becker et al. [4], which includes a Java-based prototype imple-
mented within a gigabyte router testbed. Another Java-based distributed 
architecture, RWANDA, also focuses on middleware support for enhanced 
QoS services, in the domain of high-latency environments such as the In-
ternet [38]. As the goal of the architecture is to provide a highly-adaptable 
service, a reconfigurable protocol stack to support arbitrary user-defined pro-
tocols has been implemented. The architecture also provides application-level 
control over common transmission and synchronization tasks. 
4.3 Merging Middleware and Active Network Concepts 
4.3.1 Distributed Middleware Systems 
A close relationship exists· between distributed middleware systems and ac-
tive networks. Active networks aim to provide efficient, complete, and highly 
flexible network infrastructures, and distributed middleware systems appear 
capable of enabling such systems, either in part or in whole. Despite this close 
relationship, the mainstream approach to active network design appears to 
involve the internal implementation of mechanisms for distributed communi-
cation, library loading, remote method invocation, and security management, 
with little consideration for existing frameworks that support such tasks. The 
architecture presented in this thesis presents a case for active networks that 
are based entirely in middleware, avoiding the need to 'reinvent the wheel' 
at both the architectural and implementation levels. 
Although active network frameworks provide a great degree of application-
level flexibility, for the most part they are closed systems that do not provide 
services for existing legacy client/server applications. By utilizing middle-
ware support, existing distributed applications may be easily modified to 
connect to active network architectures. In a similar manner, the presence 
of a well-defined middleware interface allows the bridging of different active 
network architectures, forming potentially global active networks without 
the necessity for an intermediate encapsulation protocol. As bindings exist 
to allow native communication between DCOM, COREA, and Java, global 
open system communication between middleware-based active networks is 
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possible, regardless of the implementation specifics. 
Many other benefits are gained through the use of middleware-based 
active networks. After the establishment of middleware interfaces for all 
packet processing routines, systems to support user-defined protocols within 
middleware-based active networks may be simplified. This is achieved by 
implementing user-defined packet processing routines as middleware compo-
nents, which are then serialised, transported, instantiated, and invoked auto-
matically by the middleware services of the host architecture. The component 
developer has the freedom to implement such packet processing components 
as desired, allowing end applications and users to request the services of such 
routines through standard middleware conventions, without any knowledge 
of the component's implementation details. 
Middleware systems also offer extensive operating system support for the 
authentication of users and processes. A fine level of control over the registra-
tion, activation, invocation, and termination of packet processing routines is 
provided, a service that is core to any secure active network architecture. Ad-
ditionally, the service of user processisolation is also common to middleware 
architectures, securing middleware-based active network architectures from 
client crashes. Memory protection is also provided by default, implying that 
client processes can only access data within their own address space. Any 
access to other data such as router state information must be authenticated, 
and invoked through well-defined interfaces. 
As middleware components are applications in their own right, compo-
nents loaded and invoked as plugin protocols from within middleware-based 
active networks have no limits on service possibilities. Middleware compo-
nents contain their own data structures, and may request the same active 
network services that are available to external applications. As an example, 
packet processing components can query the active network routers for the 
current rate of throughput, and reroute packets according to QoS constraints. 
Intelligent caching, multicasting, congestion/ admission control, mobile host 
support, NACK implosion protection, compression, and encryption are just 
a few of the many protocols that can be readily implemented as middle-
ware components. Such components, when registered, can be utilised by an 
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application throughout the network with a single method call. 
4.3.2 Existing Middleware-Based Active Networks 
Several existing systems can be identified as middleware-based active net-
works. As a three year collaborative research project, FAIN represents an 
extensive middleware-based active network architecture, aiming to provide 
a highly configurable integrated hardware/software system [17]. The FAIN 
enterprise model has now been specified, with current work focusing on the 
development of an active node platform layer, a service programming envi-
ronment, and a management system. As a component of FAIN, the Virtual 
Active Network (VAN) framework has been recently proposed [9], providing 
a generalised virtual private network, but with a greater degree of flexi-
bility and control. Using middleware as the underlying technology, VAN 
will support resource partitioning and policing, packet demultiplexing and 
multiplexing, and cut-through links for packets that do not require active 
processing. 
The ANTS active network can also be viewed as middleware-based, due to 
the inherent use of Java's distributed object communication model. ANTS 
does not, however, provide for open system communication and multiple 
language support. Finally, the RWANDA and TAO middleware frameworks 
also provide services that offer similar functionality to that of active networks. 
Regardless of their intended application, the findings of these systems provide 
valuable insight for the development of dedicated middleware-based active 
networks. 
4.4 Architectural Design 
COMAN has been designed as a lightweight yet practical desktop-to-desktop 
active network architecture, readily installable throughout a network of any 
topology, providing flexible packet processing and routing for next-generation 
services and applications. A key architectural feature is the high level of con-
nectivity available to networked applications that utilise COMAN's services, 
and to other middleware-based active networks. COMAN is also designed to 
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Figure 4.1: The high-level system architecture of COMAN. 
enforce strong levels of user and process authentication. 
All active networks aim to provide flexibility, efficiency, and security. 
However, considerable differences exist between COMAN and existing active 
network architectures. Whilst COMAN and FAIN share the common theme 
of middleware support, the COMAN architecture is considerably simpler, 
and is readily installable upon an unmodified operating system. Addition-
ally, ANTS and COMAN both ofl'er a high level of control over the processing 
of packets, but COMAN is not restricted by language, and provides a system-
wide service. Finally, unlike CANES, SNAPd, and Smart Packets, an array 
of unrestricted languages are available through COMAN, with client process 
isolation mechanisms in place to enforce system safety. 
4. 4.1 System Features 
The following paragraphs expand upon COMAN's key features, providing 
more details of the active network's architectural design. 
Flexibility 
User-defined packet and routing instructions, called router modules, may be 
developed in many languages, including C, C++, Java, Cobol, and assembly 
language. Router modules are implemented as middleware components that 
adhere to the common packet routing interface (see Section 4.4.4), provid-
ing a simple 'plug-and-play' mechanism for both module development and 
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invocation. No bounds are placed on the functionality of router modules, 
and applications may utilise the services of these modules through a single 
method call. COMAN provides control over the invocation of router modules; 
all data packets may be subjected to any given router module, or invocation 
of router modules may be restricted to all packets in a stream, or to individ-
ual packets. Packets may be subjected to processing from the sender to the 
receiver, the receiver to the sender, or in both directions. 
Packet forwarding is related to operating system route tables, which al-
lows the system to adapt to changes in the underlying route tables. For sim-
plicity, COMAN uses conventional IP forwarding logic when routing packets, 
unless user-defined routing is requested. COMAN also supports any number 
of concurrent connections, providing a full forwarding service where packets 
are placed into a FIFO queue, processed, and then routed. Additionally, 
COMAN offers a simple API which closely emulates the popular BSD socket 
layer for the forwarding of data, with extra mechanisms to specify the invoca-
tion of router modules. Due to such socket layer emulation, client programs 
may be conditionally compiled as either an active or passive applications, 
using a source code preprocessor. 
Practicality 
CO MAN executes on an unmodified operating system, entirely in user ad-
dress space. No additional drivers are required, and the installation proce-
dure is minimal, requiring no system restarts. Similarly, packet processing 
modules may be installed and deinstalled upon request, without interruption 
to the active network service. Additionally, it is not essential that COMAN 
resides on every network node. In cases where the active network service 
can not be installed, for example at a gateway router, COMAN will auto-
matically revert to IP packet forwarding across the node. Subsequently, not 
even the endpoint nodes are required to have COMAN installed, although 
the existence of the active network service at endpoints will be beneficial in 
most cases. 
As presented in Figure 4.2, COMAN is a layered architecture which pro-
vides independence from the underlying transport and network protocols. 
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Figure 4.2: Configuration of the underlying COMAN transport protocols. 
This allows COMAN to execute on any given transport protocol (or raw 
IP /IPX datagrams), presuming that the operating system network drivers 
are available. In the case of IPv4 to IPv6 protocol transition, the COMAN 
service can be reconfigured to use IPv6 without the need for service inter-
ruption. 
Unlike previous active network architectures, COMAN does not require 
additional mechanisms for the explicit formation of packets, or for the custom 
marshalling of user data; these functions are implemented internally. As a 
core component of DCOM, the MIDL interface definition language compiler 
generates optimised RPC proxy-stub client code for the underlying mar-
shalling of user data, allowing both the end-users and the COMAN system 
developers to avoid low-level coding routines. 
Security 
As a DCOM service, authentication of all active network components is main-
tained by the operating system, at both the user and machine level. Sub-
sequently, it is possible to restrict the users that may connect to COMAN 
58 
Applcations I Default Properties Defauk Securay I DefauR Protocols I l ,... -.......... -----~-----~--
may eda who is allowed to access applications that do not 
de thou own settings 
Ed1t Default.. J 
-------------
j.aunchPetmissions--~-------­
You may ed~ who is allowed to launch applications that do not 
provide their own settings. 
EdWefauk ... ' J 
AegisllyValue; OefaultAccessPennission 
Owner. Administrator 
Name: 
Type of Access: I Allow Access 
OK Cancel Add. .. 
Add Users and Groups '"~ %~ m 
List Namas From: I ®J \\CARLC_PC' 
Allow Access 
Allow Access 
Allow Access 
AetnOve Help 
Built·in account for guest access to the r 
This user account is used by Terminal S•., 
~ ShowUsoJ' !Mrnbm... Search... I 
Add Names: 
TypeofAccess: IAIIowAccess 3 
d 
..:..1 
Figure 4.3: Built-in support for the specification of user access permissions. 
and register, load, invoke, and unload router modules, as presented in Fig-
ure 4.3. If a malicious router module is executed within the network, only 
the data within the address-space of the local COMAN service can be com-
promised, as COMAN runs exclusively in safe user mode. Similarly, the 
COMAN architecture places each client in a separate process boundary, pre-
venting unauthorised access to client memory, and isolating client crashes 
from other clients and the COMAN service. 
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Accessibility 
DCOM bindings exist for C, C++, Java, and VB, allowing multiple-language 
access for clients of the COMAN active network. Additionally, several remote 
instances of COMAN active networks may communicate natively to form one 
logical active network, with the architecture reverting to conventional IP for-
warding for all passive intermediate nodes. Similarly, other middleware-based 
active networks have the potential to communicate directly with COMAN, 
due to the middleware bindings that exist between DCOM, CORBA, and 
Java. 
4.4.2 Service Establishment 
Socket-based client/server streams may connect through the COMAN ser-
vice resident at each active node, as presented in Figure 4.1. By default, 
the COMAN architecture forwards all data packets to the requested destina-
tion without payload modification. Packets may be subjected to additional 
processing and rerouting upon request through router modules, which encap-
sulate the specification of user-defined packet processing routines. 
After attachment to the COMAN service, a client may specify a desti-
nation node where a conventional socket-based server process is listening. 
This commences the establishment of an active channel. At the source node, 
COMAN uses ICMP messaging to determine the next physical hop to the 
destination, based on the underlying route table. COMAN will then attempt 
to attach to the COMAN service running on the next hop, forming the first 
logical link in the active channel. This process continues until the destination 
node has been reached, at which point a local socket connection to the server 
process is created, and the active channel is established. In the context of 
the COMAN active network architecture, an active channel is similar to a 
conventional virtual circuit. 
Upon establishment of an active channel, the client may begin sending 
and receiving data. When data is sent, it is placed into the local packet queue. 
The COMAN worker thread processes and routes each packet according to 
the instructions of the router modules associated with the channel. If a 
packet is not rerouted by any of the channel's router modules, the packet 
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is forwarded to the next active node in the channel's path. This process 
continues until the destination node is reached, at which point the data is 
delivered to the server process through the local server socket. Similarly, 
each active channel has a dedicated listener thread that is bound to the 
server process at the destination node. Upon receipt of data from the server 
socket, the listener thread places the data in the channel's received packet 
queue. Data may be removed from the queue through a blocking client-side 
method call, emulating the BSD recv socket layer routine. 
4.4.3 Router Module Design 
Router modules are implemented as COM components, which are then loaded 
by the local COMAN service at run-time. Router modules may contain 
instructions for the processing of packet payloads, which is an essential step 
when implementing encryption and compression protocols. Router modules 
may also contain instructions for the re-routing of packets, which is useful 
for the implementation of alternative routing protocols, such as multicasting 
and OSPF. 
For router modules to be successfully loaded at run-time, they must im-
plement the IRouterModule DCOM interface as described in Section 4.4.4. 
It is conventional to implement this interface using an object-oriented lan-
guage such as C++, Java, or VB, although it is also possible to implement 
such interfaces using C, Cobol, or assembly language. By the virtue of mid-
dleware, the IRouterModule interface is decoupled from the implementation 
language, which allows the programmer great freedom when implementing 
router modules. Any constructs of the selected implementation language may 
be used, including arbitrary data structures (for storing state information), 
multi-threading, and interprocess communication. 
The following is a code listing for a trivial router module, implemented 
in C++. The router module processes every packet that it is invoked upon, 
and does not re-route any packets. The router module simply replaces the 
first byte of data in each packet with the ASCII character 'A'. Whilst this is 
a somewhat meaningless router module, it demonstrates the relative ease in 
which a router module can be developed, and provides a useful outline for a 
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more sophisticated module. 
class C_ TestRMod : 
{ 
I* class C_TestRMod extends from a single-threaded wrapper class *I 
public CComO b jectRootEx< CComSingleThreadModel>, 
I* class C_TestRMod also extends from a globally-unique wrapper class *I 
public CComCoClass<C_TestRMod, &CLSID_TestRMod> 
private: 
CHAR m_iData; I I private data for this router module 
public: 
I* constructor which initialises data to the 'A' character *I 
C_ TestRMod() 
{ 
m_iData = 1 A 1 ; 
} 
I* Windows-specific macro which expands to give a complete class definition *I 
BEGIN_COM_MAP(CRModT04) 
COM_INTERFACE_ENTRY(IRouterModule) 
END_COM_MAP() 
I* IRouterModule methods *I 
STDMETHOD(get_ReRoute)(INT * ReRoute) 
{ 
} 
*ReRoute = FALSE; I I return that we wont reroute for this example 
return S_OK; 
STDMETHOD(get_Process)(INT * Process) 
{ 
} 
*Process = TRUE; I I return that we will process for this example 
return S_OK; 
STDMETHOD(ProcessPacket)(BSTR * Data, INT * Len) 
{ 
if (*Len > 0) 
{ 
I* replace first byte of packet with this router modules current data *I 
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memcpy((LPVOID)*Data, &m_iData, sizeof(char)); 
} 
return S_OK; 
} 
STDMETHOD(ReRoutePacket) 
(BSTR Data, INT Len, UINT Key, LPSTR Client, !Receiver * ActiveHost) 
{ 
return E_NOTIMPL; 
} 
STDMETHOD(get_Proceed) 
{ 
} 
(UINT Key, LPSTR Client, !Receiver * ActiveHost, INT * Proceed) 
*Proceed = TRUE; I I dont halt the flow of data 
return S_OK; 
STDMETHOD(get_Data)(INT ID, BSTR * OutData) 
{ 
} 
}; 
return E_NOTIMPL; 
4.4.4 The COMAN API 
As presented in Table 4.1, the API for COMAN consists of two main inter-
faces. The !Coman interface is returned to clients upon attachment to the 
COMAN service. This interface emulates conventional socket routines, pro-
vides support for the registration of router modules, and allows the retrieval 
of node and router module information. As an example of typical usage, 
Section 4.5 presents a simple C-based file transfer routine, demonstrating 
the creation of an active channel, the registration of a router module, the 
connection of the server socket, and the transmission of user data. 
The IRouterModule interface specifies the routines that all COMAN-
compliant router modules must implement. This interface is used internally 
by COMAN when routing packets through the network. Through the ap-
propriate interface routines, COMAN determines which modules intend to 
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I Coman 
AddManditoryModule 
RemoveManditoryModule 
AddModuleToStream 
Send 
SendTo 
SendUsingModule 
RemoveModuleFromStream Recv 
CreateSocket RecvFrom 
ConnectSocket RecvUsingModule 
GetModuleData 
GetCurrentBPS 
CloseSocket 
(a) The COMAN API for client communication. 
I RouterModule 
GetReRoutingMode 
GetPacketProcessingMode 
GetBiockingMode 
Get Data 
ReRoute Packet 
Process Packet 
(b) The COMAN API 
for router module im-
plementation. 
Table 4.1: The core APis for COMAN. 
reroute and/ or process packets, and invokes the processing and routing meth-
ods accordingly. As explained in Section 4.4.3, implementation of such rou-
tines is module-specific. 
4.4.5 Implementation Details 
As mentioned previously, COMAN is implemented as a DCOM service. The 
system executes in its own address space, and clients access the process 
through synchronous procedure calls which are managed by the operating 
system's DCOM libraries. The various address spaces are displayed in Fig-
ure 4.4, which presents a COMAN client/server active channel with associ-
ated router modules. In this example, the client process on Node 1 connects 
to the local COMAN service, which is in a separate address space. Com-
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Figure 4.4: The address space layout of a client, the resident DCOM service, 
and a server process in the COMAN active network architecture. 
munication is enabled via operating system maintained proxy/ stub pairs, 
which are mapped into both address spaces by DCOM's service control man-
ager (SCM). Additionally, this figure shows the address spaces of the loaded 
router modules on each active node. Finally, this figure also displays the 
remote server process at the terminating end of the active channel, which is 
again in a separate address space. Communication between the server-side 
COMAN service and the remote server process is enabled through standard 
BSD sockets. 
Active channels represent client/server connections over the entire active 
network. Therefore, each active channel within the network must be uniquely 
identifiable. A combination of the server-side socket handle and the client-
side machine name is used for channel identification. The COMAN service 
resident on each active node maintains a table of all active channels and 
associated router modules. Each packet in the network is stamped with the 
global channel identifier, and each COMAN service uses this identifier to 
determine which routing modules should be invoked when processing the 
packet. 
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Figure 4.5: A COMAN client application that sends text files over an en-
crypted channel. 
4.5 Application of the COMAN Architecture 
The COMAN architecture may be used for any socket-based client/server 
communication. As presented in Chapter 5, multicasting, encryption, and 
file transfer router modules (and the calling applications) were implemented 
for the purpose of system evaluation. Router modules to support compressed 
data streams should also prove trivial to implement. It should also be rela-
tively simple to implement router modules to provide support for congestion 
control, distributed data caching, dynamic routing, and QoS protocols. Af-
ter a router module has been implemented to provide a protocol or service, 
it is uploaded to each active node throughout the network, where it is reg-
istered and access permissions are set, making the module available for all 
authenticated users. 
Whilst all applications used during performance evaluations were written 
in C and/ or C++, client applications can be written in an array of languages 
including Java and VB. Client applications that wish to use COMAN for 
client/server data transfer must link against the DCOM libraries. This allows 
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the program to attach itself to the running COMAN service and utilise the 
client-side API routines. 
Once attached to COMAN, client applications may request the use of 
router modules through one of COMAN's router module loading routines. 
After requesting the use of all desired router modules, the client may then 
request to create and connect to the server process. Upon a successful con-
nection, the client may then begin sending and receiving packets through 
one of COMAN's several send and receive routines, which emulate the BSD 
socket layer. At the end of typical client usage, the client disconnects from 
the server, and COMAN reclaims all allocated resources. 
As a proof of concept, an example application written in VB is presented 
in Figure 4.5. The application sends a text file from the client node to the 
waiting server over an active channel. Once the active channel has been es-
tablished, the user is allowed to select specific router modules which perform 
end-to-end encryption/decryption on the data stream. 
It should be noted that COMAN permits connections to many types 
of server sockets. Most common are connection-oriented TCP sockets, but 
connectionless UDP sockets are also supported, as well as raw IP, which is 
typically used for ICMP messaging. Therefore, COMAN-based client ap-
plications can connect to all existing legacy server processes such as HTTP 
and FTP servers. Additionally, there are no limitations on the number of 
simultaneous client processes per active node-COMAN admission control is 
based upon a simple FIFO queueing model. 
To provide an illustration of how a client may utilise COMAN, this chap-
ter concludes by presenting a simple C++ file transfer application that con-
nects to a waiting TCP-based server: 
#include <windows.h> 
#include "coman.h" 
int main() 
{ 
IActiveHost * 
SOCKET 
FILE* 
BSTR 
p_IComan; I I pointer to the ComAN service 
SvrSocket; I I a local identifer for an active channel 
p_File; I I a file to be opened for reading 
bstrBuffer; I I a local buffer 
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I* open the local file *I 
p_File = fopen(" ./testfile", "r", 1); 
I* attach to the ComAN service through a helper macro *I 
CREATE_INSTANCE(IID_ICOMAN, (LPVOID* )&p_IComan); 
I* create a socket to the server process *I 
p_IComan-> CreateSocket 
( 
AF_INET, 
SOCK_STREAM, 
"Server4", 
SEND PORT, 
&SvrSocket 
) ; 
I I use the IP address family 
I I use TOP sockets 
I I the name of the remote server 
I I the listening port on the remote server 
I I the active channel local identifier 
I* associate a router module with the active channel to perform encryption *I 
p_IComan -> AddModuleToStream 
( 
20 
SvrSocket, I I the .active channel associated with the router module 30 
CLSID_ENCRYPT _MOD I I the global identifier of the router module 
) ; 
I* connect the socket to the remote server process *I 
p_IComan-> ConnectSocket 
( 
SvrSocket, 
TRUE 
I I the active channel to be opened 
I I boolean to bind the port prior to connection 
) ; 
I* read the open file, line by line *I 
while(fread((LPSTR)bstrBuffer, 1, BUFLEN, p_File)) 
{ 
I* send each line to listening server process *I 
p_IComan->Send 
( 
} 
SvrSocket, 
bstr Buffer, 
BUFLEN 
) ; 
I I the open active channel 
I I the data to send 
I I the length of the data 
I* close active channel now that file has been transmitted *I 
p_I Coman-> CloseSocket 
( 
SvrSocket I I the active channel to be closed 
) ; 
I* close file handle *I 
fclose(p_File); 
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} 
I* detach from ComAN service *I 
p_I Coman-> Release(); 
return 0; 
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Chapter V 
COMAN: Architectural Evaluation 
To provide an objective comparison in terms of latency and throughput 
for both single and multiple-hop data transfers, an empirical analysis of the 
COMAN and ANTS active network architectures was undertaken. Addi-
tionally, conventional C versions of test applications were trialled, providing 
a baseline comparison to passively networked applications. This chapter 
presents the findings from .the above trials, and also presents a practical test 
case in which COMAN gained an increase in the end-to-end performance 
over conventional, passive networking. 
5.1 Experimental Design 
The performance of COMAN, ANTS, and passive C-based forwarding, m 
terms of throughput and latency, was measured on a switched 100 Mbps 
Ethernet network of six workstations and four routers, with the topology 
presented in Figure 5.1. Each workstation and router had a PC clone ar-
chitecture, an ASUS 33 MHz single CPU mainboard, 128 Mb of primary 
memory, and an Intel Pentium II CPU with 16 Kb on-board cache memory 
operating at 233 MHz. All network cards were Intel Pro 100+Bs running at 
100 Mbps in full duplex mode, and the operating system used throughout the 
network was Windows 2000 Advanced Server, Build 2195, Service Release 1. 
The routers in the network consisted of multihomed workstations with 
static routes, with each router bridged by crossover Ethernet cables. All 
broadcast and background traffic was eliminated prior to testing. Finally, 
as ANTS was also tested on the network, Sun Microsystems' release of 
JDK 1.2.2 was used for compilation ofthe ANTS toolkit, and the Java 1.2.2-
001 native threads virtual machine was used for interpretation. 
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Figure 5.1: The network topology and link-layer configuration for evaluation 
of the COMAN and ANTS active network architectures. 
All applications used during the testing period were initially written inC, 
and then translated to both COMAN and ANTS. The C version of the appli-
cations used standard IP routing (as supported by the kernel), giving close 
to the maximum possible performance. The active network-based applica-
tions emulated that of the C-based applications, with the exception that all 
processing was performed in user-mode, and then passed to the underlying 
network stack for hop-by-hop routing. 
5.2 Results 
This section presents various results from COMAN's performance analysis. 
Benchmarks in the form of throughput and latency are presented in Sec-
tion 5.2.1, and an analysis of the impact of router module invocation is 
provided in Section 5.2.2. Applied performance results are also presented in 
Section 5.2.3, where COMAN was trialled in the context of multicasting and 
encryption services. 
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Figure 5.2: The average throughput of single-hop data transmission using 
passive C forwarding, COMAN, and ANTS with packet sizes of up to 32,000 
bytes. Note the x axis is logarithmic. 
5.2.1 Benchmarks 
Throughput 
The sustained end-to-end transfer of consecutive NULL characters was used 
to measure throughput rates. As a test mechanism, a TCP-based server 
process was bound at the destination node, where the server process would 
continuously accept data immediately after the establishment of a client con-
nection. To determine the throughput rate achieved, COMAN established an 
active channel from the source node to the server process, and commenced 
the transmission of 200 Mb of data. The time taken to transmit the data 
was then used to calculate the transfer rate, which was then averaged over 
30 trials. As comparative measurements, a passive C-hased client and the 
ANTS active network architecture were also tested under identical conditions. 
The ANTS application developed to measure rates of throughput was trans-
lated as closely as possible from the relatively generic C and COMAN-based 
client/ server programs. 
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Figure 5.3: The average throughput of multiple-hop sustained transmission 
using passive C forwarding, COMAN,and ANTS with fixed sized packets. 
Single-Hop Throughput The effect of packet size on the rate of through-
put over a single-hop route is presented in Figure 5.2. This measurement 
provides an indication of the baseline throughput capabilities, without con-
sideration of any active processing overheads that may be incurred by the 
active network architectures. The results show that C-based forwarding could 
achieve a throughput of 82 Mbps with a packet size as small as 1,000 bytes, 
yet even with a 32,000 byte packet size, COMAN achieved only 42 Mbps, fol-
lowed by ANTS with 29 Mbps. Whilst only slight variance was experienced, 
all methods demonstrated performance degradation when packet sizes ap-
proached 1,500 bytes, due to link-layer fragmentation. 
Multiple-Hop Throughput The effect of multiple-hop routes on the rate 
of throughput is presented in Figure 5.3. All three data transfer methods 
tested displayed varying degrees of performance degradation as the number 
of hops from sender to receiver increased. Whilst C forwarding appeared to 
be most affected by multiple-hop data transfer, the forwarding capability of 
the network was the actual limiting factor. The routers in the network are 
software based, and the hardware is of a relatively low specification, which 
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subjects C forwarding to confounded performance degradation as it reaches 
the throughput threshold for the network. The throughput rates achieved 
by the C forwarding did, however; provide an indication of the upper bound 
for the network's routing capacity. 
The rate of throughput achieved by COMAN reduced from 42 Mbps for 
single-hop data transfers to 30 Mbps for multiple-hop data transfers using 
32,000 byte packets. The 12 Mbps degradation in performance for multiple-
hop data transfer represented the additional delay incurred by the active 
nodes that routed packets onwards, where packets were both delivered to 
and sent from the user-level COMAN service. An additional decrease in 
performance was experienced for five-hop data transfer using COMAN with 
32,000 byte packets. However, again this is likely to be due to the limitations 
ofthe testbed network rather than a performance issue with COMAN. When 
reduced to 1,400 byte packets, both COMAN and ANTS demonstrated poor 
rates of throughput, with an approximate 85% deterioration in performance 
when compared to the throughput rates obtained using 32,000 byte pack-
ets. C forwarding's rate of throughput decreased on average by 40% when 
1,400 byte packets were used. 
Latency 
To measure the latency of COMAN, a ping application was implemented. As 
comparative measurements, ping applications written in C and ANTS were 
also developed. The C-based version used ICMP messages, and for ANTS, a 
ping application was readily available from the ANTS 2.0 distribution. How-
ever, as the original ANTS version of ping had only millisecond granularity, 
the program was modified to call the high-precision timer as used by the C 
and COMAN applications. Identical to the throughput trials, latency was 
tested in terms of both packet size and number of hops between endpoints. 
The response times as presented in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5. 5 represent the 
average of 200 consecutive pings, where times for each round-trip ping were 
halved on the basis that all delays within the network were symmetrical. 
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Figure 5.4: The average latency of a single-hop ping packet using passive 
C ICMP messaging, COMAN, and ANTS with packet sizes of up to 32,000 
bytes. Note the x axis is logarithmic. 
Single-Hop Latency As presented in Figure 5.4, all ping operations over 
a single-hop route displayed a linear increase in latency as the packet size in-
creased. C-ping had a relatively low latency (ranging from 300J-Ls to 3,600J-Ls), 
with COMAN-ping displaying approximately l,lOOJ-Ls more latency regard-
less of the packet size used. ANTS-ping was considerably more latent, dis-
playing at least twice the latency of COMAN-ping for every packet size 
tested. The large latencies incurred by ANTS are due to Java's bytecode-
based virtual machine, which can not gain the level of responsiveness achieved 
by native code systems. 
Multiple-Hop Latency Each version of ping displayed an increased la-
tency according to the number of hops between endpoints, as presented in 
Figure 5.5. When using 1,400 byte packets, both C-ping and COMAN-ping 
doubled their latency when comparing response times from a single-hop to 
a five-hop route. At five hops, C-ping had an average latency of 1,400J-Ls, 
with COMAN-ping averaging 2,800J-Ls. However, ANTS-ping had increased 
its single-hop latency by a factor of five, with an average five-hop latency 
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Figure 5.5: The average latency of multiple-hop ping packets using passive 
C ICMP messaging, COMAN, and ANTS with fixed packet sizes. 
of 20,500t.ts. Using 32,000 byte packets, each version of ping approximately 
tripled its latency for five hops when compared to a single-hop route. For 
a five-hop ping, C-ping had an average latency of 9,000{ts, COMAN-ping 
14,000t.ts, and ANTS-ping 41,000t.ts. 
5.2.2 Impact of Router Module Invocation 
To measure the impact of COMAN router module invocation on the rate 
of throughput, multiple router modules per node were invoked on an active 
channel. The active channel was dedicated to the sustained transmission of 
client data, using the same throughput process as outlined in Section 5.2.1. 
As an easy-to-replicate test case, each router module simply set the first byte 
in each packet from NULL to the End-Of-File (EOF) character. This pro-
vided an unbiased measurement of the overhead related to the invocation of 
router modules, regardless of additional user-defined processing instructions. 
Rates of throughput were measured for routes of up to five hops from sender 
to receiver. 
As Figure 5.6 presents, the invocation of a single module reduced through-
put by up to 50%, regardless of the number of hops in the route. For the 
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Figure 5.6: The impact of router module invocation on performance of sus-
tained multi-hop data transfer for the ~OMAN active network with a 32,000 
byte packet size. 
invocation of between two to five modules, throughput remained constant, 
but at a deteriorated rate. As expected, deterioration in throughput in-
creased with each additional network hop, due to the processing performed 
at each active node. For example, each packet of a single-hop/five-module 
active channel is processed ten times in total, whereas a five-hop/five-module 
active channel processes each packet thirty times prior to application delivery. 
As the results show, throughput rates continued to deteriorate as additional 
modules were loaded. 
5.2.3 Architectural Application 
Benchmark testing, such as the evaluation of throughput and latency, is 
useful for determining the base performance of a network. Active networks, 
however, are not intended to challenge conventional networks in terms of 
base performance-rather they provide tangible user-defined services in the 
absence of standardised solutions. The following sections present analyses of 
case studies where active networks have been used to provide new services 
on existing networks. 
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Figure 5. 7: The network topology and link-layer configuration for evaluation 
of the COMAN and ANTS active network architectures. 
Multicasting 
A typical application of active networks is the emulation of multicasting 
services where no native multicast support exists. Accordingly, the through-
put rates for COMAN and ANTS active network-based multicasting were 
evaluated, with results presented in Figure 5.8. The evaluation identified a 
scenario in which active networks provided throughput gains over conven-
tional unicasting by reducing the number of redundant packet transmissions. 
The network topology used in the evaluation is presented in Figure 5.1. In all 
experiments, the sender (10.1.1.1) transmits multicast packets through four 
active routers, arriving at up to five receivers on the end subnet (14.1.1.*). 
The data transfer method used was identical to the sustained throughput 
method as outlined in Section 5.2.1, using 32,000 byte packets. 
Four applications for the transfer of multiple data streams were trialled. 
A C-based unicast application was developed to provide standard unicast 
streaming. Multicast emulation applications were developed using COMAN 
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Figure 5.8: The throughput rates for unicast and emulated multicast data 
streaming with 32,000 byte packets. 
and ANTS, where the exiting ANTS multicast application from the ANTS 2.0 
distribution was modified to enable sustained data transfer. Finally, a hy-
brid application was developed using COMAN, aimed at providing improved 
throughput rates. The application established an active channel through 
the intermediate routers, but reverted to conventional unicast transfer be-
tween the end router and the receivers. This technique disallows any active 
processing at the receiving nodes, but vastly reduces the active processing 
requirements for the end router. 
As Figure 5.8 presents, the C-based unicast application achieved through-
put rates that were approximately twice as fast as the rates achieved by the 
CO MAN and ANTS multicast applications, regardless of the number of re-
ceivers. However, for four or more receivers, the hybrid COMAN application 
outperformed the C-based unicast application, providing at least 18 Mb of 
data per second to each receiver. With five receivers, the burden of sending 
duplicate packets over the intermediate routers restricted the C-based uni-
cast application to client throughput rates of 13 Mbps. It is likely that with 
a high-performance server architecture for the heavily loaded end router, 
COMAN's end-to-end performance would improve considerably, allowing a 
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Figure 5.9: The impact on throughput for five-hop encryption using the 
COMAN active network with packet sizes of up .to 32,000 bytes. Note the x 
axis is logarithmic. 
full end-to-end active multicast service with throughput rates similar to that 
of the hybrid version. 
Encryption 
User-implemented encryption of data streams is a practical application of 
COMAN. To evaluate the impact of user-defined packet processing routines 
on throughput rates, an encryption router module was implemented. The 
router module provided exclusive-or bitwise encryption with a known key, 
where each byte in every packet was encrypted. Decryption consisted of 
reapplying the encryption step with the same key. An active channel was 
established to transfer a sustained stream of data to a listening TCP-based 
server process at the destination node, and the encryption module was in-
voked on all packets in this channel. A five-hop route was tested, with packet 
sizes ranging from 100 to 32,000 bytes. 
To provide insight as to where router module processing overheads occur, 
various levels of module invocation were tested over distinct data streams. 
As a baseline comparison, data was transmitted without any router module 
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invocation. Data was also transmitted with a router module that did not 
perform any processing, in order to measure the overhead of per-packet router 
module communication. Next, data was transmitted with a module that 
would encrypt all packets at the source node, decrypt all packets at the end 
node, and inspect, yet leave packets unmodified, at all intermediate nodes. 
Finally, data was also transmitted with a module that performed decryption 
and re-encryption of data at all active nodes in the route. 
As presented in Figure 5.9, user-defined processing had little direct influ-
ence on the deterioration of throughput rates, unless packet sizes were over 
20 Kb. Rather, the invocation of the router modules, regardless of their 
user-defined routines, was the main cause of performance degradation. On 
invocation of a router module, each channel experienced an approximately 
50% loss in throughput for most packet sizes, regardless of the level of user-
defined processing specified by the router module. 
5.3 Notes on Experimental Error 
After presenting the experimental results, it is important to discuss the error 
associated with the data collected. For each of the experiments performed, 
only a negligible level of experimental data variation was observed. The lack 
of variation was clue to the use of a fully switched testbed network which 
operated in full-duplex mode. The network configuration eliminated line 
contention at the Ethernet level, which made the observed rates of through-
put and latency close to deterministic. 
Other general notes about the experimental results can be made. As can 
be seen in Figures 5.2 and 5.4, the C version of each experiment ran at close 
to the wire speed of the network, as very little application-level processing 
was required during data delivery. Since the active versions of each experi-
ment were CPU and I/0 bound (and subsequently much slower than their 
passive counterparts), they were not significantly influenced by variations in 
the network's maximum possible throughput for the corresponding packet 
length. This 'smoothing' effect for active network throughput and latency 
was also observed during external analysis of the ANTS active network ar-
chitecture [51, 50]. 
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Another influence on the experimental results was IP fragmentation, 
which again can be observed in Figures 5.2 and 5.4. As explained above, 
the C version of each experiment ran at close to the network's maximum 
speed, hence the C version of each experiment was more affected by packet 
fragmentation than the active versions. This can be seen clearly at around 
the 1,500 byte packet length for all experiments. IP fragmentation was nec-
essary on the testbed network as the link layer protocol used was Ethernet, 
where fixed 1,518 byte frames carried all higher-layer packets. The effect of 
IP fragmentation on active and passive networks is also displayed in the lit-
erature related to the PAN high-speed active network node [36, 35) (no other 
active network research has investigated the issue of packet fragmentation, 
or large packet lengths). 
For packet lengths of approximately 64 Kb, another drop in performance 
is noticeable. Whilst this performance deterioration is currently unexplained, 
the most likely explanation is that this is a trait of the router operating 
system. This assumption requires further analysis to provide a justifiable 
theory. 
5.4 Observations 
During all trials, a positive linear correlation was present between the rate 
of throughput and packet size for both COMAN and ANTS. When large 
packet sizes are used, fewer active processing steps per byte are required; 
such packets are fragmented at the network layer and routed as a sequence 
of smaller sized frames at the link layer. This is similar to the technique 
employed by tag switching, where processing overhead per byte is reduced by 
diverting network layer-routing to link-layer switching after the identification 
of a packet stream. 
Using low-specification desktop hardware, both COMAN and ANTS failed 
to provide rates of throughput capable of saturating a 100 Mbps Ethernet 
link. This implies that neither of the two active network architectures are 
currently suitable for use in an environment where high speed transmission 
is required, unless high-performance hardware is used. However, COMAN 
did provide relatively low latency, even with large packet sizes, indicating 
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that the architecture is well-suited to delay-sensitive, medium-throughput 
applications, such as realtime media streaming. 
As indicated by the evaluation of throughput rates, COMAN's processing 
bottlenecks occurred at the active network routers. After profiling the active 
routers under a heavy loading, it was revealed that the number of CPU 
cycles consumed when copying data from kernel to user address space, and 
the time spent waiting for I/0 routines to complete, were the main factors 
limiting COMAN's performance. By applying more processing power to 
active network routers in the form of multiple CPU machines and server 
architectures designed for high I/0 utilisation, the performance threshold of 
COMAN is expected to increase throughout the network. 
Finally, the development of specialised drivers could increase the per-
formance of COMAN in terms of both throughput and latency, by directly 
forwarding packets in kernel-mode for cases where no active processing is re-
quired. Such drivers could also make other optimisations, such as modifying 
packet headers in kernel mode where possible, to avoid unnecessary context 
switches and data copies. At an even lower level, an alternative approach 
to reducing high I/0 utilisation is in the form of programmable network 
interface cards (NICs), such as the Arsenic Gigabit Ethernet NIC [40]. The 
Arsenic 'connection-aware' NIC allows the uploading of packet filters from 
the operating system, providing limited connection-based packet processing 
without saturating the operating system with hardware interrupts. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
The active network paradigm provides networked applications and users 
with programmable interfaces that support the dynamic modification of a 
network's behavior, bypassing both the standards committee and the hard-
ware vendor in order to cater for ever-changing user demands. Such flexibility 
is achieved by allowing the specification and invocation of complex processing 
instructions at all participating intermediate active network routers, facili-
tating the run time installation of arbitrary software-based routing protocols. 
Numerous active network architectures and components have been proposed 
by established research groups, with the collective goal to develop systems 
that address the key aspects of active networks: performance, flexibility, and 
safety. Whilst the concept of active networks is relatively new, several ac-
tive network implementations have already been released for comment and 
further development. 
With the continued growth in network-based applications, distributed 
middleware systems of various incarnations have emerged to manage issues 
of complexity and scalability. The theme of managed distributed object cre-
ation, remote method invocation, object persistence, and object termination 
is common to all distributed middleware systems, hence a close relationship 
exists between distributed middleware systems and active networks. Middle-
ware systems offer many useful services for both the development of active 
networks and the integration of active networks with their host applications. 
As the primary result of this thesis, COMAN utilises such middleware ser-
vices to provide arguably the most practical desktop-to-desktop active net-
work architecture of today. Through the development of COMAN, the fol-
lowing observations have been made relating to a middleware-based active 
network architecture: 
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1. As an implementation platform, existing middleware serviCes allow 
the rapid development of an active network architecture; mechanisms 
such as client authentication, out-of-process communication, and re-
mote method invocation are available to be used as core architectural 
components. 
2. As a client/server communication mechanism, middleware provides 
standardised interfaces for the binding of client applications, the ac-
tive network service, and the end servers. 
3. As a mechanism for the encapsulation of user-defined routing and 
processing instructions, middleware services provide a standardised, 
language-independent interface-decoupling user-defined packet pro-
cessing routines from the underlying active network architecture. 
COMAN introduces the concept oflanguage-independent middleware com-
ponents for dynamic service creation, and is readily installable throughout a 
workstation-based network, providing operating system supported user au-
thentication and protection from malicious or erroneous system use. Scenar-
ios have been identified where, through the use of such middleware compo-
nents, COMAN improved the quality of application-based data transfers in 
terms of both performance and flexibility. Whilst evaluation showed that 
raw data transfer rates were slower than the rates achieved by conventional 
passive networks, considerable performance gains were made over the ANTS 
active network architecture. Additionally, the price paid in terms of perfor-
mance for the functional COMAN architecture may be mitigated by more 
powerful router hardware or specialised drivers. 
The multicasting and encryption modules, as presented during the eval-
uation of COMAN, demonstrate the architecture's practicality. The hybrid 
multicasting module provided a greater level of end-to-end throughput than 
conventional IP-based streaming for the congested network topology, and the 
encryption module allowed a different encryption realm over each hop in the 
network, with an acceptable decrease in throughput. Both of these modules 
may be freely distributed to active networks where such services are required, 
with the functionality accessible through a single call to the user API. 
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With a multiple-language active network now implemented entirely in 
middleware, future research aims to integrate COMAN with existing, spe-
cialised active network components for increased flexibility, safety, and per-
formance. 
6.1 Further Work 
Whilst COMAN stands as a useful prototype, an important next step is the 
development of a standard set of middleware interfaces, allowing integration 
with other middleware-based active networks such as FAIN. Additionally, 
the development of an enhanced middleware framework that supports code 
verification is also a key area of future investigation. To increase safety and 
performance, COMAN, with the services of security-enhanced middleware, 
has the potential to support the SNAP packet language among others, pro-
viding an interoperable, efficient, and secure active network architecture. 
The development and evaluation of QoS-specific router modules to assist 
the management of complex topologies is another potential project. Such 
work encompasses many research disciplines including protocol design and 
development, performance modelling and theoretical analysis, router module 
implementation and distribution, topology configuration and control, and 
end-application design. 
Other work towards the COMAN active network could include porting the 
architecture to Unix. This is expected to be a trivial task, but if difficulties 
arise, the migration of the architecture to COREA on both the Windows 
and Unix platforms would be an interesting research project. Additionally, 
COMAN currently has rather nai:ve admission control mechanisms which 
could be developed further. 
An obvious, yet technically challenging, next step is the development of a 
router operating system that can support middleware-based active network 
architectures such as COMAN. Middleware systems are inherently layered 
on top of the network stack, hence one possibility is the migration of a full 
workstation operating system to router hardware. Unfortunately, this solu-
tion introduces performance and security issues, as highlighted in this thesis. 
The alternative is the development of a middleware-based router that has 
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full support for middleware services at the both the network and link layers, 
allowing active network architectures such as COMAN to be integrated with 
the router operating system. 
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Glossary 
ACTIVE NODE: A network layer device that performs active processing of 
packet payloads and user-specified routing. 
ACTIVE PACKET: A network packet that is transmitted between active 
nodes. Such packets may contain user-defined instructions and/ or user 
data. 
CODE MODULE: See ROUTER MODULE. 
CONTEXT SWITCHING: The task performed by the operating system when 
saving the state of the active process, and loading the saved state for 
another process. 
EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT: The core components that collectively pro-
vide active packet processing at visible points in the network. Such 
components include the physical network host, a network stack, and 
an active network daemon/service. 
KERNEL MODE: A mode of the operating system which allows the exe-
cution of privileged instructions. The operating system process and 
device drivers are executed in this mode. 
PING: A method of sending a variable-length data payload between two 
hosts to measure latency. The most common ping implementation is 
ICMP ping, where link-layer support for ping requests has been stan-
dardised (see RFC 972). 
ROUTER MODULE: A unit of code that contains the instructions for the 
routing and/ or processing of network packets, also referred to as a code 
module. Router modules are located at active nodes and are invoked 
by the active network architecture upon user request. 
USER MODE: A mode of the operating system in which direct execution 
of privileged instructions is disallowed. User applications normally are 
executed in this mode, providing address space protection from mali-
cious or erroneous user code. 
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API 
ATM 
BSD 
COM 
CPU 
COMAN 
CORBA 
DARPA 
DCOM 
ELF 
ICMP 
IP 
1Pv4 
1Pv6 
IPX 
MIB 
MIDL 
NACK 
ORB 
OS 
OSPF 
List of Acronyms 
Application Programming Interface 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
Berkeley Software Distribution 
Component Object Model 
Central Processing Unit 
Component Object Model Active Network 
Common Object Request Brokerage Architecture 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Distributed Component Object Model 
Executable and Linking Format 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
Internet Protocol 
Internet Protocol version 4 
Internet Protocol version 6 
Internet Packet Exchange 
Management Information Base 
Microsoft Interface Definition Language 
Negative Acknowledgement 
Object Request Brokerage 
Operating System 
Open Shortest Path First protocol 
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PO SIX 
PVS 
QoS 
RFC 
RIP 
RPC 
RSVP 
SNMP 
TCP 
UDP 
VTBL 
Portable Operating System Interface for Unix 
Prototype Verification System 
Quality of Service 
Request for Comment 
Internet Routing Protocol 
Remote Procedure Call 
Resource Reservation Protocol 
Simple Network Messaging Protocol 
Thansport Control Protocol 
User Datagram Protocol 
Virtual Function Table 
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Appendix A 
Code Availability 
The source code for the COMAN architecture is available for down-
load from http:\ \www. cosc. canterbury. ac. nz\ ~ clc38\coman. html. The 
source code is released for non-commercial use only, and includes all router 
modules and applications presented in this thesis. The ANTS applications 
and protocols presented in this thesis are also available from the above site. 
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